



基調講演 「日本の北東アジア再考」

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今日は3つのテーマで話をしたい。最初に、日本の対外政策や国際関係がこの60年間にどのように展開してきたかということについて、簡単にその背景をお話したい。次に大韓民国、中華人民共和国、ロシア、朝鮮民主主義人民共和国の政策・路線について大体の近況を、最後にこれらの国々に対する日本の経済政策について手短にお話したい。

（15年単位でみる日本の対外政策）

日本の外交は、第二次世界大戦の敗北によるアメリカとの同盟が機軸にある。これが日本の外交の主要な旋律を奏でていることは、現在でもあまり変わっていない。ただ、つぶさに見ると、ほぼ15年ごとにトーンが少しずつ変わっている。どうして15年かは、景気変動、技術進歩、さらにアメリカの政策の変化が関係しているが、国内的な要素が非常に大きいと思う。

外国、とりわけ欧米の間で、「日本人はどうして物事を決めるのが遅いのか」という人が多い。自民党の大島理森国会対策委員長によれば、他の人よりも絶対に足を前に踏み出さないのが現在の日本の国会で普通になっていて、進展が少ないという。それに似たことは米國務長官を務めたヘンリー・キッシンジャーも、日本人は決定するのが非常に遅い、どんなに大きな問題でもどんなに小さな問題でも遅い、と言っている。

彼は3つの例を挙げている。ひとつは1853年のこと、アメリカ海軍のペリー提督が日本に来た。ところが日本は15年間モタモタして、その間に内戦のようなことが起こるなどした。どうして日本人は決めることが遅いのか。1868年、明治維新が行われたのが15年後だった。

2番目は1945年、日本は第2次世界大戦に完敗して降伏した。その後与野党が激しく対立し、ようやくアメリカとやっていくしかないとの結論に達する。しかし、政府レベルで決議したとはいえ、市民レベルまで浸透したのは1960年だという。これも15年かかったことになる。

3番目の例は、1991年のバブル崩壊。その後、不良債権への公的資金投入の是非や投入の度合いをめぐる論争などで15年が費やされ、2006年になってようやくほぼ解決した。

これが日本の議論のやり方なのだ。他国をみれば、例え

ばイギリスでは、軍事用の原子力潜水艦について30年間議論してまだ決まらない。逆に、アメリカは1秒で決めるようにみえるが、それをわざわざ元に戻すために10年とか15年とか使っている。ものは考えようで、日本人はちょうどいいスピードで進めているようにも思える。

この15年単位は、日本の外交の変化を見る場合にも都合がいい。

1945年以降は、一般に言われる吉田ドクトリンが1960年まで続いた期間であって、この期間は日本人の意見が激しく割れ、内紛・対立があった。それらは決定に至る過程というのが正しいところであろう。その後、60年から75年ぐらいまでは吉田路線の実践期間となり、結果、安全保障はアメリカに任せて経済に専念するという吉田路線が、第一次石油危機や中東戦争に至るまで続いた。

ところが石油危機や中東戦争のおかげで、経済に専心してもどうしようもないことがわかり、西側同盟の中の一員という路線に少し変化させたのが1975年から1990年になる。陣営の一員として、できることはやろうということになっていく。

これですばらく安定するかと思えば、今度は冷戦体制が崩壊して、西側も東側も不穏になっていく。その中で日本にとっていかなる外交路線が良策か。そう考えたときに、別の路線、つまりシビリアンパワーという文民大国、軍事力はあまり使わなくても世界に貢献できる国になるという方向へ進んだ。しかし、それもあまり遠くまでいかないうちに難しいことがいろいろな形で起こるようになった。特にグローバルなテロリズムが目につくようになり、アメリカを中心としてそれに反対する運動が強まって、日本も参加することになった。結局はシビリアンパワーだけでもうまくいかない状況になったのである。しかも、内政も大きく関わらざるをえない非常に難しい時期に2000年代から突入した。

1945～60年、60～75年、75～90年、90～2005年と、2005年というのは15年という単位で機械的に言ったのだが、15年ずつ変化してきた。2003年には日本もイラク戦争に参加し、今回の国会で議論された「新テロ特措法」もあり、この路線がどこまで進むかはまだ不明確だが、キッシン

ジャーが言ったように日本人は15年ぐらいたつとようやく路線が定まる。

ただ15年を経過すると環境も自分の考えも変わり、また別な路線が出てくる。2005年から2020年は、紆余曲折を経ながらグローバルに、しかし他の国と似たようなことを普通にやりたいという路線に変わっていくだろう。「普通の国」というのは戦争をやらないでもないという意味でとられるが、ここでいう「普通の国」とは、ほかの多くの国がしていることを少しでもやるというぐらゐの意味で、おそらく日本の場合は現実が先行している。

この60年、微妙に路線が違ったが、その機軸にあるのは対米同盟であった。しかし、2000年代に至って大きな変化が起きている。

そのひとつの例として、東アジアの域内貿易の額が急激に増加していることがあげられる。現在、日本の貿易相手国のナンバーワンは中国であり、日本・韓国・中国間の貿易は対米貿易などと比較にならないくらいに大きく増加している。

さらに、同じく2000年代になって急激に増加しているのが旅客である。こちらもまた増加の一途で、現在、日本・韓国・中国間を飛行機で移動する旅行者は年間1,000万人程度に増えており、今後おそらく5年もしないうちに1,500万人、あるいはそれ以上に増加するだろう。

この国々の中の往来が、人・物・考え・技術など様々な相互作用を非常に濃密にし、しかも迅速になっている。

端的な事実として、これらの主要都市の中心にある空港が拡大している。日本でいえば羽田空港にあたる。成田空港に対して羽田、韓国でいえば仁川空港ではなく古い街にある金浦空港、これらがまた拡大しようとしている。

北京でいえば、郊外にある北京空港ではなく、南苑空港がオリンピック開催に向けて急速に勢いを増している。上海では虹橋空港という市内にある古い空港が拡大している。後から造った浦東空港は広大だが中心市街地から遠く、虹橋が再度注目されている。

人が動くとビジネスは成立しやすくなり、信頼も高めやすい。技術も移転しやすい。多方面において良い効果が期待でき、さらに相手の歴史や文化、人間についても理解しやすくなり、大きな変化を導くだろう。

(北東アジア各国の対外政策とその方針)

2000年代は、大きな変化が底辺から静かに起こっている。しかし一方で、様々な遅れもある。(北東アジアの)どの国をとっても、インフラが必ずしもスムーズで効率の良いものになっていない場合が多く、ビジネスが必ずしも変化

に付随しないこともありながら、とにかく大きな変化が起こっている。

日本の対米同盟は大きくは変化せず、しばらく続いていくだろう。そのような環境の中で、韓国・中国・ロシア・北朝鮮がどのような政策を打ち出してくるかということについて簡単に述べる。

まず韓国について、12月の選挙で当選した李明博(イ・ミョンバク)次期大統領についてお話したい。李氏の経歴は、ビジネスマンからソウル市長になり、非常にダイナミックである。非常に前進型でもある。大島理森国会対策委員長の描く日本人とは違って、早く前進するタイプだ。

注目すべきことに、当然ではあるけれども、大韓民国憲法の大統領の権限は莫大なものである。その秘書が、男を女に変えることと女を男に変えること以外は何でもできる、と豪語するくらい権限が大きい。それに対して日本の首相はほとんど権限がないに等しい。内閣の閣僚とほとんど同格かちょっと高い程度である。直属の部下が非常に少ないし、組織としてはほとんどないので、特定の政策指示はほとんどできないようになっている。これは憲法によって決められている。ましてや内閣法は戦前からほとんど変化がない。

韓国の大統領の権限がどのように展開されるかという点で、李明博次期大統領の考え方は注目に値するし、彼の取り組みは非常に積極的だ。

まず科学技術の積極的な研究開発投資を重要視している。この分野においてはOECDのトップ7とか、6、5くらい、積極的に推進するだろう。

自由貿易協定についても積極的だ。前政権が韓米自由貿易協定を結んでおり、その実施までにはしばらく時間がかかるにしても、さらに詰めていかななくてはならない問題だ。米韓双方の事情がある中でうまくいくかどうかはわからないが、李明博次期大統領はものすごく積極的だ。なぜならば、彼は盧武鉉(ノ・ムヒョン)大統領よりも、農民・農業をもっと自由化すべきだ、と信じている。生産性の低い製造業やサービス業においても、労働者が一時的に失業しても自由化すべきだと考えている。

安倍晋三前総理が就任直後に韓国と中国を訪問した。韓国を訪問したときに盧武鉉大統領と会見し、日韓経済連携協定案のようなものを結ぶことになり、内容がほぼ固まってサインすればよいという段階で、潘基文(パン・ギムン)氏(当時外交通商部長、現国連事務総長)が盧武鉉大統領にサインするよう差し出したけれども、盧武鉉大統領がこれを拒否したということがあった。その拒否の大きな理由は、日本人にとってはちょっと不思議に感じるだけ

ども、韓国が米国に対して農業における自由化という大きな決定をしているのに対し、日韓経済連携協定においては農業自由化が進んでいないことに対するいらだちを感じていた、というのが本当らしい。加えて、盧武鉉大統領は歴史認識などで日本にマイナス感情を持っていたことも影響し、結局うまくいかなかった。しかし、李明博次期大統領は違うと感ぜられる。農業の自由化については強く推進してくるだろう。

直接投資についても李明博次期大統領は積極的だ。世界のどこへ行っても韓国の資本家がいる。日本の企業からみれば、ビジネスサイズが小さい、成長が期待できない、というようなものに対しても、ものすごい勇気・元気で投資を行っている。これは李明博次期大統領のもとでさらに加速するだろう。韓国キリスト教グループがアフガニスタンでタリバンに拘束された事件があったが、布教しようという韓国人が実に多く、投資しようという人もきわめて多い。

北朝鮮に対する直接投資にも積極的だ。ただ盧武鉉大統領と違うのは、real reciprocity（真の互恵）つまり北朝鮮が非核の方向に進まない限り、韓国の北朝鮮に対する直接投資は進まないということを明快に示している。北朝鮮が開放する限り、積極的に投資しようという考えがはっきりしている。小さい投資は開城を中心にあるが、これをさらに拡大しようとしている。北朝鮮の事情にもよるが、六カ国協議の終了とともに、あるいは合意するとともに、北朝鮮とアメリカが国交正常化を進めたいことは明らかだ。韓国は、日朝ピョンヤン声明にあるような日本の約束を自らのフレームの中に入れて考えている。韓国は、北朝鮮に対する投資を日本よりも積極的に考えているが、real reciprocityの立場で、北朝鮮の非核化について強く要求していくだろう。

韓国の積極性については開発の度合いや経済発展の段階の違いということで説明できるが、グローバル化に対する積極性という点でも日本と対照的であり、すでに中学校レベルで中国語と日本語を必須にすることを決定した。義務教育で第二外国語を学ばせ、学ばせるだけでなく習得を目標にしている。日本で英語の習得が進まない実情と大きな違いだ。韓国の大学生は皆、英語が上手である。日本の大学生よりもうまい。授業も英語が多い。それに加えて、今度は中国語が日本語を習得しないと中学を卒業できない。これは考えさせられる材料であろう。

中国に話題を移す。胡錦濤主席が推進していることは、調和、中国語で言えば和諧（hexie）である。経済発展が

激しいために社会的に難しい問題が累積しており、毎週のように何百・何千人を動員するような大きなデモ、抗議、騒動が起こっている。そういう中で和解し、できるだけ平和的に問題を解決しようと政府として全力を尽くし、対外的にもどの国とも事を構えずに平和的に進めたいと考えている。

中国にはいま経済発展のモメンタムがあり、10年続くのか20年続くのかわからないけれども、それを犠牲にしてまで外国と事を構えることは絶対したくないという決意がある。おそらく和諧政策は内外に浸透していだろうが、国内的には結構難しい。国内では腐敗が展開し、強制的な土地収用など人権が著しく侵害された人々を生み出している背景があり、和諧としてどこまで政策実行できるか難しい問題だ。しかし、対外的な姿勢においては非常に明確である。

昨年、アメリカ空母が横須賀から出航し香港に寄港することを許可されたのだが、移動中、中国政府からいったん許可された入港を拒否するという通達があった。アメリカとしてはちょっと信じられなかっただろうが、結局横須賀に帰ることになった。しかしその際、米空母は台湾海峡を通過して中国政府を怒らせてしまった。そこまで事を構えていいのだろうか疑問だが、そこまで徹底しないと台湾の存在に対する中国国内での国是が浸透できないということなのかもしれない。胡錦濤主席は非常に難しい問題を抱えながらも、とにかく経済のモメンタムを活用したいと考えているのだろう。それが中国を世界の大国にする一番の道であることを信じており、そこから国内政策も対外政策も考えないとうまくいかないだろう。

世界銀行総裁のロバート・ゼーリック氏は、「中国は責任あるステークホルダーにならなければならない」と言ったが、その論と胡錦濤主席の和諧政策はそう大きく違わない。そういう意味では、中国は非常におとなしく、しかし自分の立場が優位だと考えている問題、例えば台湾、人権、歴史、領土についてはなかなか譲らない。

福田総理が中国を訪問したときも、必ずしも具体的な合意には至らなかったようだ。東シナ海の問題はエネルギー問題と領土問題が混在し、すぐに決定に至らなかったということであり、胡錦濤路線の性格を非常によく物語っていると思う。

ただ、この胡錦濤路線は、日本との結びつきについては非常に積極的で、経済的・技術的・文化的な結びつきを通じ、中国自身が必要としている科学技術、先端技術を進歩させようとしている。先端技術について、例えば特殊鋼では、中国はまだ高品質なものを作ることはできない。韓国

で作れ、日本では以前から作っているけれども、中国は作ることさえできないでいる現状があり、中国の指導者はいらだっている。この解決には、科学技術の発展が不可欠であることを彼らはよく理解しており、その進歩を強く望んでいる。

環境を持続的な形で維持することについては、オリンピックを控えて改善に躍起になっているが、一朝一夕にできるようなものではない。環境問題についても日本との協力が非常に重要だと考えている。

今はバブル形成過程にあり、金融の安定性についても非常に心配している。現在、金融経済学や金融工学が非常に人気のある科目になっている。富裕層が増え、その一方で金の動き方がかなり歪んだ形になっていることについて、理解してはいるが対処できていない状態にある。

このような状況のなかで、中国と日本はお互いに利する関係をしっかりと積み上げていきたいと思っている。

プーチン大統領のロシアについて話を移す。先の選挙で、プーチン大統領の政党が大きく勝利した。その後、彼は憲法により自らは首相となり、かわりに自分の手下を大統領にするという形をとることにした。このプーチン政策で今のところ一番重要なのは、ロシアは北のサウジアラビアにはなりたくないということだ。

サウジアラビアや湾岸諸国は、石油資源により、どのポケットにもお金があふれている。インフラ投資について若干弱いところがあり、産業投資も人口が少ないこともあってあまり進んでいない。資源があるとはいえ、科学技術を高度化しなければ、ロシアはサウジアラビアやクウェートの二の舞になる、ということを宣言している。

昨年秋、プーチン大統領は副首相と科学相を日本に送った。科学技術の政府間協力を合意したかったのか、あるいは探りに来ただけなのか、あまり日本ではニュースにならなかったが、ロシアとしては日本との協力はこの分野だと思っていることは確かである。私の友人の袴田茂樹教授がプーチン大統領に会ったときも、彼は科学技術で日本を再認識していると述べた。

プーチン大統領はもともと柔道の大家である。来日した際にも柔道をした。お嬢さんもサンクトペテルブルク大学で日本語を勉強している。だからといって日本びいきということでもなく、エネルギーや領土問題、平和条約についてプーチン大統領の姿勢は強硬だ。加えて、科学技術の協力については非常に積極的である。

アメリカの積極的な対ロ政策については非常に批判的だ。アメリカはポーランドやチェコ国内に、ロシアを念頭

に置いたと思われるようなミサイル基地あるいは補助施設を造ろうとしている。これに激しく反発しているのがプーチン大統領である。自由や民主主義というのは外国から干渉されるものではない、内政干渉は絶対いやだという「主権民主主義」を強く主張している。次に首相になったときにどのような政策を展開するのか、非常に興味深い。

最後に朝鮮民主主義人民共和国、そして金正日（キム・ジョンイル）国防委員会委員長がどのように考えているか簡単にまとめてみたい。

朝鮮民主主義人民共和国にとって、冷戦終焉は厄年の始まりに等しい事態を招くことになった。冷戦がある限り、中国もソ連も、韓国、アメリカ、あるいは日本が勢力圏を伸ばすような事態になっては困るので、様々な形で北朝鮮を支援してきた。ところが冷戦の終焉で、知ったことじゃないということになった。中国もロシアも、国民所得の1人あたりの水準が非常に低い、エネルギーもない、外貨もない、何にもない北朝鮮を積極的に支援することは少なくなった。

さらに1994、1995、2004、2005年に大飢饉で多くの死者が出た。洪水や不作など様々な要因が関連して、多くの人が食物を口にすることができない状況が10年周期で起きている。

エネルギーも大変貧しい。国内の発電機能も充実していない。中国国境の鴨緑江に水豊ダムがあるが、これは日本の旧植民地時代に造ったもので、これを少し改良したダムが未だに主要電力供給源となっている。これでは供給不足だということで核開発も進めたが、なかなかできないし、小規模で、いろいろな障害もある。

平和的な核エネルギー開発だけではなく、核兵器も使っているという諸外国からの疑念が非常に強く、六カ国協議が形成された。それにも増してアメリカの経済制裁があり、日本もその経済制裁に参加し、これが大きな打撃となり、持続的なボディブローとして続いている。

結局、アメリカと北朝鮮の最後の合意ポイントは、アメリカにすれば北朝鮮の非核化である。「核開発をやめろ、核戦力をなくせ」と主張し、それがどのように実証できるか視察しようとしている。しかし、北朝鮮からの報告は曖昧であったり、そのことに触れなかったりしている。

北朝鮮からすれば、金正日委員長を首領とする政治体制を崩壊させることなく、その体制を保障せよと主張している。北朝鮮が核戦力を維持できるような力をどこかで温存させながらもアメリカが認めることを待っているのか、ごまかそうしているのか、明確ではない。

アメリカとしても、どこまで北朝鮮の体制保障をするかが問題である。保障して勝手なことをされても、アメリカの国是に反することになる。両社は共に合意にたどり着きたいと思っているのだろうし、それは今まさに六カ国協議の進展が示しているところである。紆余曲折があったとしても、お互いに半ばまで理解しながら、相手を許容するという合意パターンがありえるのではないだろうか。

その背景として、アメリカはパレスチナ・イラク・アフガニスタン等に多くの戦力を投入している現状があり、北朝鮮と一戦を交えるという展開は避けたい。北朝鮮の核兵器は排除したいが、エネルギー開発については何らかの形で認めようとしているのだろう。イランの方が核開発の途中であるならば、先にイランを抑えたほうがより効果が上がるとも考えている。民主党政権8年の間に、北朝鮮はほぼ核兵器を作ったらしく、それを全部無効にすることは難しい。北朝鮮に対しては核不拡散に焦点を当てて、イランに対しては核を絶対作らせないという姿勢で現在、強硬に出ている。

おそらく六カ国協議が合意に達するとともに、あるいはその後に米朝国交回復は進むだろうし、六カ国協議の一員である日本もその路線に乗る形で、個別に日朝国交回復について協議を開始することになるだろう。

文正仁(ムン・チョンイン)延世大学教授は、韓国の金大中(キム・デジュン)元大統領の初めての北朝鮮訪問時と盧武鉉大統領の平壤訪問時に同行し、いずれの際も金正日委員長と握手したが、最初に比べ後の握手は弱々しい感じだったと話している。金正日委員長は自分の体力が落ちていることを自覚しているだろうし、国家の存亡に対する大きな不安の中にいると思うが、これがどんな帰結になるのかはよくわからない。

中国としては、北朝鮮に崩壊されても困る。鴨緑江や豆満江をはさんで領土の主権が侵されやすい状況にあり、政治的にも不安定化の要素のひとつになる。軍事的・政治的に警戒しているため、中国は六カ国協議に積極的な姿勢を示している。韓国にとっても崩壊されては困るわけで、何とかしたいと考えている。日本としても、それほど不安定化の要素になるのであれば、無視できない。

もし北朝鮮が崩壊し、朝鮮半島全土が韓国のものになれば、韓国としても問題だ。北朝鮮は今年が60周年記念、1948年に建国している。しかし人口は減少し、体格的にも小柄になっている。

いずれにしろ、今後の行く末はいま大きな岐路にさしかかっている。おそらく北朝鮮は崩壊せず、六カ国協議が成立し、アメリカ・中国・韓国としては、北朝鮮がもう少し

文明的な手法で政治をするなら今の国を温存してもいいという結論になるのではないか。しかし核兵器については廃絶してほしいという方向で進んでいくと思われる。

金正日委員長は内部の不安定化にならないような形で、少しずつ、慎重に進めている。韓国は、日本からの賠償金として問われている協力金のようなものをすべて自らのフレームに入れて考えているほど思考が進んでいる。こういった観点も認識しながら、日本としてどう対応するか。六カ国協議が成立したときの日本の考えをしっかりと議論しなければならない。

(4つの隣国に対する日本の経済政策)

最後に、日本の経済政策について述べる。簡単に言えば、領土・歴史認識・人権などの問題に深く関わってないところではビジネスがどんどん進行している。最近の証明のひとつとして、安倍前総理が中国を訪問し、いくつかの問題については何とか解決していこうということで、経済的・技術的・資金的なつながりが一気に改善され、現在もどんどん拡大していることがあげられる。政府間協議が進展していないところでも、例えばトヨタ自動車はサンクトペテルブルクに自動車工場を作っている。政治的な問題が大きな障害になっていない分野では、これからもどんどん進んでいくだろう。

しかし、なぜ今までそう進んでいなかったかといえば、政治的な問題の他に、両方の側でビジネス・インフラストラクチャーが非常に弱いことも要因であった。

空港のインフラについては先述したが、各国主要都市における問題はある。韓国の金浦空港は街の真ん中にあるが小さい。仁川空港はソウルまで距離がある。北京空港は中心市街地から遠く、街の真ん中にある南苑空港はどこまで機能的に使えるかが問われる。上海では虹橋空港を造ったけれども規模が小さく、ずっと海のほうに浦東空港を造った。しかし、これまた規模は大きい上海中心部からは遠い。いろんな形でインフラが不十分で、日本や韓国が優れているとは威張れない。早急に改善されなければ、経済発展のビジネス・モメンタムがあふれているにも関わらず、使えない状態にある。

政治的なものは国民の世論が基礎にあり、それと大きくかけ離れるような政治的な合意は作りにくい。今後の展開を待つしかないだろう。インフラ整備についても、ビジネスがくるということがなければ、金も時間もかかる。しかし、これだけのビジネス機会を座視したままになっていることも確かであり、何とかしなければならぬ問題である。

なぜこのように展開しているのかといえば、人口力学だ

と言えよう。2050年に人口が増加している国、「大国」といえる国はどこか。はっきりしているのはインドであろう。次にアメリカ。少しずつ増え続けるのがイギリス。対して、ロシアは人口が急速に減少している。ヨーロッパも日本も落ちている。

これがどういうことになるかといえば、高齢者が増えることになる。そして年金や医療などがさらに必要になり、その額がどんどん上がる。そうした場合、インフラ対策については優先順位が下がる。なかなか国民全員が了解しなくなってくる。ましてや軍事的なものに対しては強い反発がある。それはどこの国でも同じで、これに反対しない国はインドとアメリカだろう。

東アジアのように経済発展のモメンタムがまだまだ隠されているところでは、インフラに対する投資、科学技術に対する研究開発投資の2つなくしてこの問題の解決はない。人口は減少していくが、社会をダイナミックに展開するのはこの2つである。ソウル - 北京 - 東京で日帰りという日が目の前にある。東アジアは山手線のようなエアシャトルが技術的には可能だが、現段階では各々のインフラが未完成だ。世論としても多額を投じてまでなすべきかという疑問が多いだろう。しかし、それは明らかにビジネスの発展を抑えている要因のひとつだ。

また、とりわけ金融が21世紀の大問題となり、サブプライム・ハウジングローンなどの問題を起こし、1カ所で発生すればほかのところに悪影響を与える。こうした緊急事態にうまく対応するためには、金融当局が様々な形で連携

し、迅速な対応が求められている。

韓国は積極的、北朝鮮は起死回生の大博打を打とうとしている。中国は事を構えず、しかし積極的にやりたい。ロシアは激しく積極的にやりたい。アメリカも積極的だ。景気が少しばかり後退しよう、アメリカ人はビジネスといえれば元気が出る。今後10~20年はそういう形で進展するのではない。

そういう中で日本は、政治的な障害をどう考えるか、どのような合意を作るか、インフラ整備をどこまで真剣に迅速にやるかということが、非常に重要だ。韓国・中国・ロシアといった近隣の経済発展のモメンタムが爆発しそうになっており、さらに興味をもって関心を高くしていくことがビジネス機会を増すことにもなるだろう。

その中で、新潟県・新潟市はその要の位置にある。ぜひとも様々なビジネスを起こしてもらいたい。インフラもできるだけ迅速に対応してほしい。こうしたことは待ったなしであり、これだけのモメンタムにあふれている今、課題はたくさんあって困ることはないと思う。

香港には空港が2つあり、近くには深圳や広州の空港、さらにその周りの空港など、日本の羽田や成田よりも大きな規模の空港がたくさんある。それぐらいビジネス機会が勢いよく拡大している。

日本の場合は橋を3回叩いても渡らないというほど慎重すぎる面が目につく。大いに元気を出し、勇気をもって前に進むことが、新潟のような地方の発展を約束するものだと信じてやまない。

*Keynote Address***"Japan Rethinking Northeast Asia"**

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I would like to talk on three themes today. First of all, I would like to give the background, in simple form, of the evolution of Japan's foreign policy and international relations over the last 60 years. Next, I would like briefly to talk about the recent overall situation regarding the policies and directions of the ROK, China, Russia and the DPRK, and finally about Japan's economic policies vis-à-vis those countries.

[Japan's Foreign Policy Viewed in 15-Year Blocks]

Following its defeat in World War Two the cornerstone of Japan's diplomacy became its alliance with the US. That this forms a major refrain within Japan's diplomacy has scarcely changed through to this day. If you look closely at this, however, the timbre changes somewhat practically every 15 years. Why every 15 years or so? It may have to do with economic developments, technological progress, or changes in US policy, but I think domestic factors feature large.

In other countries, notably in the US and Europe, it is often remarked that Japan is slow in making decisions. According to Tadamori Oshima of the LDP, a Diet policy committee chairman, it is customary in the Diet that nobody dares to take the first step, so that progress is small. A similarly thing was also said by former US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger; that Japanese people are very slow in coming to a decision, and are slow however large or small the problem.

He gave three examples. The first was when Commodore Perry came to Japan in 1853. Japan dithered for 15 years, however, and during that period there was something akin to civil war. Why had the Japanese been slow in making a decision? In 1868, 15 years on, the Meiji Restoration took place.

The second example was 1945, when Japan was completely defeated in World War Two and capitulated. Subsequently, the ruling party was vehemently divided, but eventually a conclusion was reached for Japan to just go along with the US. Even though there was a decision at the government level, however, it was 1960 when this permeated down to the public. This had taken 15 years.

The third example was the collapse of the bubble economy in 1991. Subsequently, 15 years were spent in the conflict over the pros and cons of the injection of public funds into delinquent loans and over the amount of that injection, and in 2006 it was finally resolved to all intents and purposes.

That is Japan's method of debate. If one looks at other countries, for example Britain, the 30-year-long debate there on nuclear submarines still has not ended. Conversely, the US seems to make decisions in a flash, but it takes them 10-15 years to get back to their original starting point.

It all depends on how you look at it, but it seems to me that Japan is proceeding at just the right speed. These 15-year blocks work well when looking at the changes in Japanese diplomacy.

Post 1945, what is generally called the Yoshida Doctrine continued until 1960, and in that period the opinions of Japanese were violently split, with infighting and conflict. I think that the process of reaching a conclusion to these was probably the right thing to do. Following that, from 1960 to around 1975, was the period for the implementation of the Yoshida Doctrine, with the result that the Yoshida Doctrine, where security was delegated to the US and Japan concentrated on economic matters, continued until the first oil crisis and war in the Middle East.

Due to the oil crisis and the Middle East war, it became clear that for Japan to devote itself entirely to the economy was untenable, and the shift in direction toward being a more active member in the Western Alliance occurred from 1975 to 1990. They would henceforth have to try and do what they could as a member of the Western camp.

Just when they thought they would have some stability, along came the end of the Cold War, and both the Western and Eastern Blocs entered unsettled times. Amid this situation what would be a good policy for Japan's diplomatic line? Japan came up with a different course, and started down a new path of "civilian power," meaning a country where military power would not be utilized much at all and a contribution could be made to the world. Before much progress could be made, however, difficulties in various forms began to crop up. Global terrorism, in particular, became prominent, and the campaign in opposition to this, with the US at the center, gained strength, and Japan participated too. Eventually it became the case that being a civilian power alone wouldn't work. Furthermore, Japan plunged into the very difficult period of the first decade of the 21st century, which had to greatly affect domestic politics also.

Regarding 1945–60, 1960–75, 1975–90, 1990–2005, and 2005, I have said that these are 15-year blocks of a mechanical, repetitive fashion, and every 15 years changes have come about. In 2003 Japan participated in the Iraq War, there was also the "new Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law" debated in the current Diet session, and although it is unclear how far Japan would proceed along this path, as Kissinger had said, it is after roughly 15 years that Japan's course finally becomes fixed.

With the passing of just 15 years, the situation and one's own thinking will change, and again a different course will emerge. From 2005 to 2020, passing through many twists and turns, globally, there will however probably be

a change toward a course of aspiring to do things normally, in a way similar to other countries. A "normal country" can be taken as meaning that we won't definitely not wage war, but what is called a "normal country" here means doing to a small degree what many other nations do, and in the case of Japan, reality is probably already in the lead.

Over the last 60 years, the diplomatic line has differed subtly, but its core has been the alliance with the US. Yet at the beginning of the 21st century great changes are taking place.

One example is the explosive increase in intraregional trade in East Asia. Currently China is Japan's number one trading partner, and the combined trade between Japan, the ROK and China has increased much more greatly in comparison to that with the US.

In addition, there has been a similar explosive increase in passenger numbers since 2000. These have continually risen, and the annual number of air-travelers between Japan, the ROK and China has increased to around 10 million, and within five years will probably reach 15 million or even more.

The traffic between these countries has resulted in a very dense interchange of people, goods, ideas and technology, and what's more is hastening.

A direct indicator of this is that the airports near the centers of major cities are expanding. In Japan this is Haneda Airport. Haneda (as opposed to Narita Airport) and in the ROK, Gimpo Airport in the old city area, (rather than Incheon Airport), are striving to expand.

In Beijing, rather than Beijing Airport on the outskirts, Nanyuan Airport is rapidly increasing its efforts for the Olympic Games. In Shanghai, Hongqiao Airport, an old airport within the city, is expanding. Pudong Airport, built later, is huge, but it lies far from the city center, and Hongqiao is once again the focus of attention.

When people move, it facilitates the establishment of businesses, and an increase in trust. It facilitates technology transfer. Good effects in many areas can be expected, understanding of the other countries' history, culture and people will be facilitated, and this will probably usher in great changes.

[The Foreign Policies and Directions of the Nations of Northeast Asia]

In the new millennium, great changes from the bottom-up have been quietly taking place. On the other hand, however, there are various bottlenecks. Whichever (Northeast Asian) country you look at, while there are many instances of infrastructure that is not always smooth and efficient and there are businesses which don't always do that which is concomitant to any change, major changes are occurring in any event.

Japan's alliance with the US will probably continue for some time, with no great changes. Against such a backdrop, I will state in simple terms what kinds of policies the ROK, China, Russia and the DPRK have come up with.

Firstly I would like to talk about the ROK, and about the president-elect, Lee Myung-bak, who won the December election. Mr. Lee was originally a businessman, who became mayor of Seoul, and he is very dynamic. He

is also very progressive. According to the description by Diet policy committee chairman Tadamori Oshima, he is different to Japanese people, and is more progressive.

It's worth mentioning that, although making good sense, the powers of the president under the ROK constitution are enormous. The president's secretary has boasted that presidential powers are so great that, other than change male to female and vice versa, the president can do anything. In contrast the powers of the Japanese prime-minister are negligible. The prime-minister's powers are almost at the same level as cabinet ministers' and only a little higher. Direct subordinates are few, and as the office of prime-minister scarcely exists in institutional terms, it mostly is unable to create specific policy. That is laid down by the constitution. Beyond that the Cabinet Law has hardly changed from that before the war.

As to how the powers of the president of the ROK will evolve, it is worth looking at the thinking of president-elect Lee Myung-bak; his approach will be very proactive.

Firstly, he places importance on active investment into research and development into science and technology. In this area, he would actively push the ROK into the seventh, sixth or fifth position among the OECD nations.

He is proactive on free trade agreements (FTAs). The preceding ROK administration signed an ROK-US FTA, and even if its implementation takes some time, it's a question of sticking with it. Whether things will go well amid the state of affairs in both the US and the ROK is not clear, but Lee Myung-bak is incredibly proactive. Why? Because he, more than Roh Moo-hyun, believes that agriculture should be further liberalized. He thinks that service industries and manufacturing industries with low productivity should be liberalized even if it leads to temporary unemployment of workers.

Immediately after the former-Prime Minister Shinzo Abe took office, he visited the ROK and China. When he visited the ROK he met President Roh Moo-hyun, and there was a draft for a Japan-ROK FTA, in which the details had been mostly settled, and which was about to be signed. Ban Ki-moon (then the Minister of Foreign Affairs, currently the Secretary-General of the United Nations) handed it to President Roh Moo-hyun for signing, but President Roh refused to do so. The major reason for that refusal, although it seemed a little strange for the Japanese, was that it was apparently true, after the ROK's great determination in liberalizing agriculture vis-à-vis the US, that there was irritation toward the fact that progress in agricultural liberalization had not gone any further in the Japan-ROK FTA. In addition, there was the influence of President Roh Moo-hyun having negative feelings toward Japan on such matters as the interpretation of history, and in the end things did not work out. President-elect Lee Myung-bak, however, seems to be different. He will probably strongly promote agricultural liberalization.

On direct investment, president-elect Lee Myung-bak is active. Wherever you go around the world, you will find ROK financiers. They are courageously and vigorously investing in—as viewed by Japanese enterprises—small-scale businesses and those where there is a low expectation of growth. Under (president-elect) Lee Myung-bak this would most likely accelerate further. Although there has

been the kidnap of an ROK Christian group by the Taliban in Afghanistan, there truly seems to be a great many people in the ROK who are ready to go out and proselytize, and a very large number who are willing to make investment.

He is proactive too on direct investment in the DPRK. In a difference to President Roh Moo-hyun, he has made clear that there must be a "real reciprocity"; if the DPRK doesn't move forward in the direction of denuclearization, the ROK will not move forward on investment in the DPRK. He has made clear his thinking that the ROK will actively seek to invest in the DPRK only as long as the DPRK opens up. There is a modest investment in the center of Kaesong, but he will strive to expand that. Depending on the situation in the DPRK, and with the completion of the six-party talks or an agreement, it is evident that the DPRK and the US want to advance the normalization of relations. The ROK is considering incorporating within its own framework commitments along the lines of Japan's in the Japan–DPRK Pyongyang Declaration. The ROK is actively considering investment in the DPRK, more so than Japan, but from the position of "real reciprocity" it will probably make strong demands concerning the denuclearization of the DPRK.

The ROK's get-up-and-go can be explained by the differences in the extent of development and the stage of economic development, but its get-up-and-go on globalization contrasts with Japan, and they have decided that the Chinese and Japanese languages are to be compulsory at the junior-high-school–level. Having a second language taught as part of compulsory education is not just to have it taught, but has the aim of its acquisition. This differs greatly from the actual situation in Japan where English acquisition is not making progress. All ROK university students are proficient in English. They are better at it than Japanese university students. In addition to this, if junior high school students don't learn Chinese or Japanese they won't graduate. That should be food for thought.

I will now move on to China. What President Hu Jintao is promoting is harmony, or *hexie* in Chinese. Due to intense economic development, difficult social problems have accumulated, and almost on a weekly basis there are demonstrations, protests and disturbances drawing hundreds and thousands of people. To bring reconciliation in these situations the government is doing its best to try and solve problems as peacefully as possible, and in foreign relations also they want to move forward peacefully without confrontation, no matter the country.

In China today they are enjoying economic momentum, although they don't know whether this will continue for 10 years or 20 years, and they are determined that they definitely not sacrifice it over a confrontation with another country. The *hexie* policy will probably permeate domestically and internationally, although domestically this will be quite difficult. In China there is growing corruption, the forced appropriation of land, the creation of people whose human rights have been dramatically infringed and amid this backdrop the problem is difficult of how far they will be able to implement the policy in the name of harmony. Their stance toward others countries, however, is very clear.

Last year a US aircraft carrier left Yokosuka, and although having received permission to make a port call in Hong Kong, on its way there the Chinese government revoked the once approved entry into port. For the US it was hard to believe, but in the end the ship returned to Yokosuka. On that occasion, however, the US aircraft carrier came back via the Taiwan Strait. It is questionable whether it was a good idea to go that far, although it is probable that the national line vis-à-vis Taiwan would not be able to permeate domestically if they didn't drive the message home. While President Hu Jintao is beset by extremely difficult problems, I think that at any rate he wants to make the most of the momentum of the economy. I believe this is the chief route to making China a global major power, and they have to consider domestic and external policy in that way, otherwise things won't go smoothly.

Robert Zoellick, the President of the World Bank, has said "China must become a responsible stakeholder," and that argument doesn't differ to such a large extent from President Hu Jintao's *hexie* policy. In that sense, China doesn't make much fuss, although when it considers its own position to be paramount, for example on Taiwan, human rights, history and territorial disputes, it is highly inflexible.

When Prime Minister Fukuda visited China, there were no concrete agreements reached. The East China Sea problem is mixed up with energy and territorial problems, and that no decisions were made speaks volumes about the character of Hu Jintao's policy.

This Hu Jintao line, however, is very proactive on links with Japan, and via economic, technological and cultural ties, is attempting to advance the science and technology and state-of-the-art technology which China itself needs. In state-of-the-art technology, taking the example of specialty steel, China is still unable to produce high-quality specialty steel. The ROK can produce it, and Japan has been able to do so for quite some time. The current situation is that China cannot do so and the Chinese leadership is quite frustrated about that. Regarding the solution, they understand well that the development of science and technology is essential, and strongly hope for progress in it.

On maintenance of the environment in a sustainable manner, with the Olympics just round the corner they are going all out with improvements, but this can't be achieved overnight. I think cooperation with Japan is very important regarding environmental issues.

Now a "Bubble" is beginning to form, and they are very concerned about financial stability. At the moment monetary economics and financial engineering are becoming very popular subjects. The well off have increased, but at the same time the flow of money has become quite uneven, and they are aware of this yet don't know what to do.

Under these circumstances, I think that China and Japan will want to build up solidly their mutual beneficial relationships.

I will move now to the Russia of President Putin. In the recent elections, President Putin's party won a large victory. Following that he decided that, in keeping with the

constitution, he would himself become prime minister, and his subordinate would become president in his stead. The most important thing in Putin's policy at this point in time is that Russia does not want to become a northern Saudi Arabia.

Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States, thanks to their oil reserves, have pockets bulging with money. Their investment in infrastructure is somewhat poor, and investment in industry, having small populations, has not made much progress. It has been declared that, although having resources, if it doesn't develop its science and technology to a high level, then Russia will follow in the footsteps of Saudi Arabia or Kuwait.

In autumn of last year, President Putin sent a deputy prime minister and the Minister for Science and Technology to Japan. It was not major news in Japan whether they wanted to get an agreement on intergovernmental cooperation in science and technology, or only came on a fact-finding trip, but it is a certainty that Russia is thinking about cooperation with Japan in this field. My friend Professor Shigeki Hakamada met President Putin, and Putin said that in science and technology he had rediscovered Japan.

President Putin is a judo expert. When he came to Japan he did some judo. His daughter is studying Japanese at Saint Petersburg State University. That doesn't mean he's a Japanophile, and President Putin takes a tough position on energy and territorial issues and on a peace treaty. Furthermore he is very active in cooperation in science and technology.

He is very critical of the active anti-terrorism policies of the US. In Poland and the Czech Republic, the US is trying to construct missile bases or subsidiary facilities which are thought to have Russia in mind. President Putin strongly objects to them. He advocates a "sovereign democracy" which absolutely rejects interference in domestic politics, and liberty and democracy are not things which interfere from abroad. It's extremely interesting what policies he will develop once he becomes the next prime minister.

Finally I would like to draw together briefly what the thinking is of the DPRK and National Defense Commission Chairman Kim Jong-il.

For the DPRK, the end of the Cold War saw the ushering in of conditions that were to prove the beginning of its years of great crisis. While the Cold War existed, and with the DPRK troubled by the ROK, the US and Japan seeking to expand their spheres of influence, both China and the Soviet Union supported the DPRK in various ways. With the end of the Cold War, however, the DPRK went on as if nothing had changed. In both China and Russia the per capita national income is very low. The active support for the DPRK—with nothing at all, with zero energy or foreign currency—shrank.

Furthermore in 1994, 1995, 2004 and 2005 there were a great many deaths from large-scale famine. Various factors combined, such as flooding and crop failures, leading to a situation, occurring on a ten-year recurring cycle, where a great many people had no food for their stomachs.

The DPRK is extremely energy-poor. The country's electricity generating facilities are not fully utilized. There is the Supung Dam on the Yalu River, which forms part of the border with China. The dam was built in the Japanese colonial period and some minor improvements were made, and it is still a major supplier of electrical power. In such circumstances, with a shortfall in supply, the development of nuclear power has moved forward, but it has not been too successful, and there have been various small-scale impediments.

Misgivings from other countries have been strong that this is the development of nuclear energy not for peaceful means alone, but for use in nuclear weapons as well, and the six-party talks framework was put together. The US has increased international sanctions, and Japan has participated in those sanctions, and this has been a blow, and is continuing as an ongoing "body-blow."

Ultimately, the US and the DPRK's final point for agreement, as seen from the US-side, is denuclearization. They advocate "Stop nuclear development and get rid of your nuclear capability," and they are making efforts for inspections to verify how that is proceeding. The reports from the DPRK, however, are ambiguous, and do not touch upon this matter.

For the DPRK-side, they are insisting that they get guarantees for the survival of their system, as they don't want the collapse of their political system with Kim Jong-il at the helm. It is unclear as to whether the DPRK is waiting for the US to concede to their retaining a power that in part includes maintaining their nuclear capability, or whether they are just trying it on.

For the US, to what extent they will guarantee the DPRK's system is the issue. Giving guarantees and letting the DPRK do what it wants would go against US national interests. Maybe both sides would like to arrive at a joint agreement, and progress on this is just about to be made at the six-party talks. Although there have been many twists and turns, there seems to be a pattern of agreements involving understanding each other up to a point where they meet half way, while at the same time making some concessions.

As a backdrop to this, there is the current situation of the US devoting substantial military power to Palestine, Iraq and Afghanistan, and the US wants to avoid the opening of a new theater of operations with the DPRK. It wants the elimination of the DPRK's nuclear weapons, but may be ready to allow nuclear power in some form for the development of energy. In the case of Iran, in the middle of the development of a nuclear program, it is considered that, in terms of effectiveness, dealing with Iran first has overtaken dealing with the DPRK. During the eight-year Democrat administration the DPRK had practically produced a nuclear weapon, and it would be difficult to completely nullify that. The current hardening position is a target of non-proliferation for the DPRK, and absolutely no production of nuclear weapons for Iran.

Along with the six-party talks probably reaching agreement, or more specifically sometime later the probable restoration of diplomatic relations between the US and the DPRK, there will be a climbing on board of this direction by Japan, one of the members of the talks, and talks on a

separate restoration of diplomatic relations between Japan and the DPRK will commence.

Moon Chung-in, a Yonsei University professor, who accompanied the first visit to the DPRK by former ROK-President Kim Dae-jung and the visit to Pyongyang by Roh Moo-hyun, shook hands with Kim Jong-il on both occasions, and he said that, in comparison to the first time, the handshake the second time was limp. I think that amid the uncertainty about the fate of the nation, perhaps Kim Jong-il is conscious that his own strength is fading, but I really don't know what consequence this holds.

In the case of China, it would be a headache if the DPRK collapsed. Lying across the Yalu and Tumen rivers, China's territorial sovereignty can be easily breached, and this is a factor for destabilization, including in the political sphere. In order to sound military and political warnings, China has adopted an aggressive posture at the six-party talks. For the ROK too, they want to do something as a collapse would spell trouble for them. For Japan as well, it cannot ignore the problem if it becomes a factor in increasing instability.

If the DPRK collapsed, and the whole Korean peninsula fell to the ROK, that would be a problem for the ROK also. The DPRK this year celebrates the 60th anniversary of its establishment in 1948. The population has decreased, and the people's physical stature has also got smaller.

In any case events are approaching a major crossroads. I think that the DPRK will probably not collapse, agreements from the six-party talks will be enacted, and for the US, China and the ROK, if the DPRK were to conduct politics in a slightly more civilized manner, then there would be the outcome of their permitting the survival of the DPRK of today. On nuclear weapons, however, it is thought that the course of the desired elimination of nuclear weapons will move forward.

Kim Jong-il is cautiously pushing ahead, little by little, in a fashion that will not create internal destabilization. Regarding the ROK, the thinking has gone as far as considering that all the funds for cooperation from Japan, the disputed compensation payments, be placed within the ROK's own framework. While being aware of this point of view, how should Japan respond? Japan's thinking when the six-party talks are concluded must be robustly discussed.

[Japanese Economic Foreign Policies toward its Four Neighbors]

Finally I will speak about Japan's economic policies. Put simply, business is moving apace in areas not deeply bound up with such issues as territorial disputes, the interpretation of history and human rights. As a recent piece of evidence for this I can give the example of when former-Prime Minister Abe visited China, and with a desire to somehow resolve several issues, economic, technological and financial ties were improved at a stroke; and they are also presently rapidly expanding. Even where intergovernmental talks have not advanced, Toyota, for example, has built an automobile plant in Saint Petersburg. In areas where political problems do not form major obstacles this situation will probably rapidly progress from this point on.

If we talk about why things haven't progressed until now, however, a factor other than political problems is that the business infrastructure on both sides is extremely weak.

Although I commented earlier on airport infrastructure, it is a problem for the major cities of every country. Gimpo Airport in the ROK is a short distance from the center of Seoul. Incheon Airport is distant from Seoul. Beijing Airport is far from the central city area, and under debate is how and to what extent they can utilize Nanyang Airport, which is in the city center. In Shanghai, they built Hongqiao Airport, although small in scale, and Pudong Airport way out toward the coast. The latter, although again large in scale, is far from Shanghai city center. In many forms infrastructure is inadequate, and Japan and the ROK cannot congratulate themselves that they are superior. If improvements are not made swiftly, in spite of a flourishing business momentum from economic development, it will be unusable.

Public opinion is the foundation for political matters, and political agreements far removed from that will be difficult to conclude. We can only wait for future developments. Regarding infrastructure improvements, if there is no coming of business, then they will take both time and money. It is certain, however, that we will end up looking idly on as such business opportunities pass by, and it is a problem about which something must be done.

As to why the situation is unfolding in this way, the answer is population dynamics. Where are the "population superpowers," countries which will have an increasing population in 2050? The most obvious is probably India. Next comes the United States. Increasing continuously in small increments will be Britain. In contrast Russia will see its population fall rapidly. In both Europe and Japan the population will be falling.

As to how this will end up, the answer is an increase in the elderly. Pensions and medical treatment will be all the more necessary, and that cost will rise rapidly. In such a situation, infrastructure policy will slip down the order of priorities. The consent of all citizens will not be received readily. Not to mention there will be strong opposition to military matters. That will be the same for every country, with India and the US probably being the countries that won't oppose it.

In places where the momentum of economic development similar to East Asia's is still obscured, doing away with both investment into infrastructure and investment into research and development in science and technology is not the solution to that problem. The population will be decreasing, but the things that will develop society dynamically are these two kinds of investment. The time is coming of being able to make a Seoul-Beijing-Tokyo day-trip. An air-shuttle route resembling the Yamanote Line [Tokyo subway circle line] is possible, in terms of technology, in East Asia, but at the present time the various kinds of infrastructure are incomplete. As for public opinion, there are many doubts as to whether there should be the investment of large amounts of money. This is, however, a factor which is clearly arresting business development.

Additionally, finance in particular will become a major problem in the 21st century, and with the occurrence of

problems such as with subprime mortgages, adverse effects can spread from one original point. In order to respond to such an emergency situation, the cooperation of financial authorities in various forms and a swift response are required.

The ROK is actively playing for high stakes in the resuscitation of the DPRK. China is not seeking confrontation but wants to be proactive. Russia wants to do things aggressively. The US is proactive too. Although the economy is gradually losing ground, when it comes to business they are enlivened. I think things will probably follow that pattern over the next 10–20 years.

In those circumstances, it is extremely important for Japan how they think about political obstacles, what kind of agreements they make, and to what extent they earnestly and swiftly carry out infrastructure improvements. With the momentum in economic development of the neighboring countries of the ROK, China and Russia looking set to explode, taking an even greater interest will probably lead

to an increase in business opportunities.

Within this, Niigata Prefecture and Niigata City are in a central position. I earnestly hope for the creation of various kinds of business here. I would like to see the tackling of infrastructure matters as swiftly as possible. This is not a question for delay, and today, which is brimming with so much momentum, I think we won't have a problem if a lot of infrastructure is put in place.

There are two airports in Hong Kong, nearby are the airports of Shenzhen and Guangzhou, and with other airports in the surrounding area, there are a lot of airports larger in size than Haneda and Narita in Japan. Business opportunities are expanding with that kind of energy.

It is striking, in Japan's case, that it is overly cautious. I sincerely believe that moving forward with great vitality and courage will hold the promise of development for a region like Niigata.

[Translated by ERINA]



基調講演 米国の通商政策：多国間主義の代替策としての 地域主義と二国間主義

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今日は、政治の話、制度的な基礎、あるいはアメリカの通商政策の実質的な面について、特に、多国間主義という米国の通商政策の一つの手段から、地域及び二国間主義へ移ってきた過去20年間の動きについて話したい。まず、米国の通商政策の基本的な特徴もしくは事実について振り返る。その後、最近の政権の歩みと、どのようにこのテーマを扱ってきたかを話し、最後に、今起きていることにどのように対処すべきか、また米国は北東アジア、東アジアにおける動きにどう対応しようとしているのかについて述べる。

最初に、皆さんがあまり考えていないかもしれない一つの現実を話したい。ブッシュ政権とそれ以前の米国行政府における大統領の権限の強さについて様々に言われ、ブッシュ政権は立法府と司法府に圧力をかけていると批判されている。しかしブッシュ政権は、それ以前の政権から行政府の力が落ちてきたことを間違いなく感じている。チェイニー副大統領はしばしば、1970年代のウォーターゲート事件から大統領府がまだ復活していないと言っている。米国の通商政策の構築にあたって、大統領及び行政府は明らかに弱い立場になっている。

あまり知られていないことかもしれないが、米国憲法が通商政策に対する権限のすべてを議会に与えているという点で、米国は民主主義国家の中でユニークだと言えるだろう。実際、200年の間、大統領、行政府は通商政策にほとんど関与していなかった。

1790年代から1930～1940年代の通商政策は、基本的には関税についてであり、議会が議決を行っていた。政権との折衝もあるが、20世紀に入るまでは、共和党の大統領ならば保護貿易主義党という暗黙の合意で、共和党議会により高い関税率を進めてきた。当時の通商政策はおおむね、議会によって提案、作成、施行された国境税政策にすぎなかった。

1930年代以降、これがどのように変わったかについて細かくは述べないが、民主党・共和党が入れ替わる議会と共和党大統領の下、あまりにも状況が複雑になり、議会は政策を実行できなくなった。政策を策定することはできても、通商政策が国境を越えたり、サービスや規制に関連したり

すると、施行できなくなった。

また、大恐慌のときの議会の通商政策について、一連の国の反発があった。第二次世界大戦後、超党派級の人たちは、米国などの1930年代の保護主義が大恐慌や第二次世界大戦を引き起こしたわけではないが、密接に関与していたことは明らかだという見方を示した。経済学者から見れば、大恐慌を引き起こしたわけではないが長引かせたという意見の一致があった。

そこで、大統領が力をもつべきだという総意に基づき、ある程度の権限が大統領に移った。しかし米国議会、下院歳入委員会、上院財政委員会が最終的な決定者であることは間違いない。米国通商政策の策定において最も大きな権限をもつのは、そのときの歳入委員会の委員長であるのは間違いない。確かに調整や連合を組むこともあるが、究極的には議会が権限を持っている。

20年前、行政府になんらかの柔軟性を持たせようとした議会は、いわゆる「ファスト・トラック権限」と呼ばれる「貿易促進権限」を可決した。これは、議会が大統領に「我々は指針や主要な政策を策定したい。しかし我々は、大統領が1930年代以降、そしてGATT、WTO以来行ってきたように、この政策を実行に移してほしい。我々は他国との交渉ができない。しかし、指針を出すからそれに沿って欲しい」と言ったわけである。次に議会は「貿易相手国が最終案をもって交渉のテーブルにつかねばならないわけだから、我々は大統領に信任投票しよう。大統領や政権と意見は一致しないかもしれない。しかし一定期間内は意思決定をさせよう」と伝えた。そこで大統領はGATTであれ、他の2国間交渉であれ、「このように進め、議会も反対はしない。長引かせたり、数年間も進行妨害されたりすることもない。信任投票も得られる」と言えるわけである。これが政権と議会の間で1970年代から続けられた通商政策の協力、調整の要となっている。

これが行き詰まったというところから二つ目のポイントに入りたい。1970年代後半以降、特に80年代後半から90年代にかけて、第二次世界大戦以降続いた超党派の支持が徐々に失われ始めた。共和党が通商政策を批准し、米国が貿易自由化の主導的な立場を取るべきだという意見の一致

があったものが、80年代後半から90年代、そして今に至るまで、徐々に崩れ始めている。共和党がおおむね自由貿易協定、新自由貿易協定、GATT・WTO合意を支持する一方、民主党は分裂している。1990年代のクリントン政権末期、下院において民主党の3分の2は自由貿易協定に反対した。共和党も、とりわけ南部の繊維部門ではグローバル化に反対票を投じる者がいないわけではないが、3分の2は支持し、3分の1は懐疑的もしくは反対し、民主党は反対する、ということが予測されるようになった。それが最近、より大きな意味を持つようになっていく。

クリントン政権の初期、共和党ブッシュ政権から続いたNAFTAの交渉、ウルグアイラウンドを停止させる交渉の継承について反対の動きがあった。議論の後、大統領と経済顧問は、より大きな貿易自由化に踏み切った。クリントン大統領の初期のスローガンは、「我々は競争するのであって、後退するのではない」というものであった。

現在の民主党の2候補、ヒラリー・クリントンとオバマも非常に注意を払っている。2人とも、特にある程度クリントン政権を継承するクリントン夫人は、完全に反対をしているわけではない。しかしクリントン夫人は、非公式に、自分が当選した場合の通商政策はクリントン第三期ではない、独自の考えを持つと言っている。このように民主党は分裂し、このことについては重要なので、後にも述べたい。2006年に民主党が議会を支配し、もし2008年に大統領職と議会をとった場合、米国の通商政策は大きく変わるかもしれない。それがいったい何になるのか、私にも予測はできない。

そこから第三点目に移りたい。大統領はいったん就任すると、議員よりも国際的な見方をする。100年も続いた保護主義から共和党を方向転換させた1950年代のアイゼンハワーであれ、貿易自由化から離れる党の動きに抵抗した1980年代のカーター大統領、1990年代のクリントン大統領であれ、大統領はより国際的な形で動く。それは本人の最終的な責任でもある。私は多少、米国の通商政策の経済的土台について悲観的かもしれないが、結局、政権の責任とこれから述べる外交政策に関する点を考えると、誰が大統領に選ばれ、議会の構成がどうなるうとも、2009年に米国の通商政策が大幅な方向転換をすることはないだろう。

以上、政治的、組織的事実を三点述べた。四点目に、その次の話と大きく関連することとして、実質的な内容について話したい。米国が通商政策に二国間主義、地域主義を加えるなかで、多国間主義やWTO（または以前のGATT）は最優先課題であり、それは政権にとっても同様であった。

ブッシュ政権がドーハ・ラウンドの完了を最優先に二国間協定の交渉を始めたが、多国間主義から離れたとは言えないであろう。ここでブッシュ政権におけるドーハ・ラウンドの立場の分析をしようとしているわけではない。私自身はすでに彼らが弱腰だったという批判はしている。ブッシュ政権も末期であり、ドーハ・ラウンドの農業改革に向けて政治的にもっと大胆でもよかったのではないかと思うのである。米国が製造、サービス、規制政策など、ドーハ・ラウンドの主要分野の先頭に立ったという点は、批判できない。そして2009年に共和党、民主党のいずれが大統領になったとしても、他の米国通商政策は変わるかもしれないが、WTOと多国間主義は最優先課題であり続けるだろう。

さらに言いたいことは、アメリカの状況だけでなく、世界の状況である。私は、WTO、多国間制度が一つの終止点にきているのではないかと考えている。間違っていればと願うのだが、これが破綻するのではなく、しかしドーハ・ラウンドにおける主要な問題に対する現実的な解決策を見出すことができず、小さいパッケージでの二国間合意、そして最終的には地域的合意にいかざるを得ないのではないか。地域的合意が多国間合意と同じくらい難しいという点については後ほど触れるが、私自身は、二国間、多国間合意は、東アジアに限らず、世界中でこれからも続いていくと考える。

経済学者たちが10年くらい前から心配しているような、世界が排他的な三つのブロック、アジア、南北アメリカ、EUに分断されてしまうことは起こらないであろう。米国、EU、その他の二国間合意をみても、3分の1か2分の1は地域間で行われている。米国に続いてEUが韓国と交渉を行っている。米国との二国間合意は世界中で行われている。実はチリやメキシコといった小さな国が二国間合意のチャンピオンとも言え、チリはほとんどあらゆる地域と国との間で二国間合意を締結しており、シンガポールも同様のことを目指している。アジアでもどの地域でも、相互に排他的な経済ブロックを作るような過程を進むことにはならないであろう。二国間合意にも問題点はあるが、これがその1つだとは思っていない。

一般的な観測として、大きな対外政策、安全保障を目標とした一つ的手段として、米国、ブッシュ政権にみられる通商政策について述べたい。ブッシュ政権の政策ではっきり打ち出されているように、通商政策が前面に現れたのには特別な理由があると思う。同時に、共和党でも民主党でも、いろいろな理由からブッシュ政権の延長と見なされたくないであろうが、米国通商政策の策定において、対外政策に対する考慮は唯一とはいわないまでも、まさに重要な

一部となっていくであろう。

私の間違いであることを望むが、米韓FTAが来年成立するというのに、強い疑いを持っている。恐らく次の政権までずれ込むだろうが、そうなると一つの解釈として大変な問題になると言える。なぜなら、オバマであれヒラリーであれ、通商政策、二国間合意を激しく非難し、韓国を批判する新しい民主党政権が誕生するからだ。「誰が韓国を失ったのだ」という非難を恐れて最終的には成立するだろうが、大事なことは、この交渉のあとで韓国に平手打ちを食らわせるなら、あるいは交渉を終わらせないなら、積極的に投票するつもりがないなら、交渉に入るべきではないという考え方である。

現在、対コロンビアでも民主党議会は同じような状況に直面している。選挙に行き「コロンビアを失ったのは誰だ」、「チャベスを招いたのは誰だ」と言われたくない。誇張しているかもしれないが、ここから政治的な議論に発展する可能性がある。企業はますます、米国の政治・安全保障の目的と併せて通商政策を捉えなければならなくなるであろう。

企業はこのことに不満をもち、不平を言うだろう。なぜなら、米国の大統領は冷戦時代に何度も、米国の経済的な利益を犠牲にしたと言ってきたからである。彼らが言っているのは、米国の大統領がバリアを下げ、貿易の自由化が行われたことで、一時的にいくつかの産業が打撃を受けたことである。国益にとっては良かったと私は思うが、アイゼンハワー、ニクソン、カーター大統領が、ソ連・中国の共産主義から同盟国の経済を救うために何とかしなければならぬと考え、1960年代から1990年代にかけて、繊維、鉄鋼、自動車産業が結局は貧乏くじを引いた。それがまた現れると私は思っている。

個々の政権については逐一取り上げないが、米国の多国間主義だけが通商政策である、という見方から離れる動きについては説明したい。米国は、1945～1980年代後半の日本と似たような状況にある。日本はかつてGATTに入り、その数十年後の1999～2000年まで、強固に忠実に多国間主義を支持し、やむを得ずそこから離れていった。米国は長い間、GATTを支持しながら、同時に「二国間主義」、「一国主義」とも呼べるものであった。1960年代から1980年代にかけて、GATTがカバーできない部分がずいぶんあり、米国は常に日本、EU、その他各国とGATTの枠外で個々の二国間交渉権を留保してきた。日本は1970年代～1990年代にかけてその中心にあった。これを二国間主義というのか、ともあれ多国間政策と共にあった

いわば秘密裏の政策であった。

1980～1990年代にかけて、米国は二国間主義、地域主義に傾いたが、そういう枠組みはつくらなかった。事象に対応したと考えている。多くの貿易関係の文献でNAFTAまたは南北アメリカのFTAの影響が取り上げられているが、米国がNAFTAへの連結を始めたわけではない。カナダとメキシコがアメリカに近づいてきた。イスラエルとの二国間合意が唯一で、独特のものであった。通商政策のというよりも、いうなれば米国が通商政策を安全保障政策と結び付けた始まりであったが、最後まで貫かれることはなかった。

経済ではなく、安全保障と政治的問題が、最初のブッシュ政権において我々を地域主義に向かわせた。このことを強調したいのは、私がこれから申し上げるように人、個人の問題であり、誰かが大きな影響力をもつ可能性があるからである。

米国の通商政策並びに外交・安全保障政策に大きな影響を及ぼしたのはジェームズ・ベーカーだと言える。ベーカーは政治的な理由をもって強力にNAFTAを支持し、ブッシュ政権は、国務長官で後の財務長官ベーカーが南米に何らかの補償をすべきと考えていたため、その提案を推進した。1997年の東アジアの金融危機からの影響が今も残り、南米も東アジアほど深くはなかったが、それぞれ1980年代に金融危機を経験し、米国とIMFは厳しい処方箋を出した。ベーカーが、我々は何かをしなければならぬと言ったことが、一つの背景にあった。

ベーカーは独自に行った。彼は、米国通商代表のカーラ・ヒルズと当時の副代表とが、二国間合意、地域合意に断固反対していたことを知っていた。彼らは、米国はGATTを重視し、そこから離れるべきではないと主張していた。ベーカーはそれを覆した。彼はレーガン、ブッシュに近かったのである。これが、十分に練られた純粋に経済的な決定ではなく、政治的・外交的決定として取り扱わなければならない理由である。

そうは言いながらも、さまざまな出来事が米国をこのような方向へ動かしたこともまた事実である。そのうちの1つは、ウルグアイラウンドが行き詰まってきた1989年～1991年、米国では別の方向へ行こうという圧力があり、ベーカーがそれに応えた。興味深いのは、クリントンが政権に就いたとき、すでに民主党内部は大きく分裂していたことだ。クリントンがとった最も果敢な二つの行動は、最初の年に、政党が分断されることを予測しながらもNAFTAとWTOを支持したことである。

クリントンは彼の政権の最後の6年間、これまでにない

貿易促進権限の状況に直面した。議会は彼にその権限を委ねることを拒否した。これは民主党の中で意見が分かっていたからであり、少数派とはいえ、民主党の票を得なければならなかったからだ。1994年以降、議会選挙で政党にマイナスになることを恐れたクリントンは、貿易促進権限を強くは推し進めず、最終的に2001年、アルバート・ゴアは大統領になるチャンスを失った。党が分裂し、前に進めなかったわけである。

しかし、今日の私のテーマに関して言えば、クリントン政権は議会に行く必要がなかったため、完全に約束をするつもりだった。1994年、南北アメリカの貿易自由化を2005年までに行う宣言をマイアミで行った。これはクリントン政権が終わる後の話なので、彼は議会とは関係なく約束だけすればよかった。

同じようなことがAPECでも起きた。1994年に、2010年もしくは2020年に向けたボゴール目標が出された。APECが独特だったのは、通常の互惠主義協約ではなく、これが異なる貿易協定である点であった。日本、ASEAN諸国が先導し、いわゆる「一致団結した一国主義」、つまり2010年もしくは2020年までにそれぞれのペースで貿易自由化に向かうというものだった。ルールに基づいておらず、それを履行しなくてもよかったクリントンにとっては、このような約束は容易だった。

経済学者のためにもう一つクリントン政権について述べると、クリントン政権下で、米国経済学者の間で初めての激しい論争があった。米国あるいは他の国・地域が二国主義か地域主義か、多国間主義へ動くとはどういうことなのか、貿易の多様化と非効率制度について、純粋に経済に基づいた議論があった。財務次官で後の財務長官でハーバード大学の学長となったローレンス・サマーズ、クリントン政権内ですべては良いことのためにと訴えたローラ・タイソンなどである。サマーズの言うところを要約すれば、「すべての主義、多国主義、二国間主義、地域主義に賛成する。いずれにしろバリアを下げればいい」ということである。それに対して、常にノーベル賞候補に挙げられているジャグディッシュ・バグワティほかの経済学者グループは、これは米国が行くべき道ではない、恐ろしい警告であり、世界経済の効率を下げるので主導すべきではないと考え、反対の意を唱えた。このような論議があったが、クリントン政権の最後の6年間はさしたる進展はなかった。

次にブッシュ政権に話を移したい。先に述べたように、二国間主義、地域主義の議論が10年ほど続き、ジェームズ・ベーカーと最初のブッシュ政権の下で、外交政策や安全保障を通商政策に生かす、もしくは同等の立場にすべきであ

るという通告があった。そして良くも悪くもロバート・ゼーリック通商代表のとき、ブッシュ大統領も支持して政策にまとめた。それまでの二つの見解を大統領と政権に支持されて実際の政策に作り上げた1つの転換点であり、非常に重要な制定であった。ゼーリックはベーカーの弟子ともいえ、彼がいたのは重要だった。ゼーリックの第一の野心は国務長官になることであり、彼は通商政策をベーカーと同様に米国の国益の一部と見なしていた。これは特に同時多発テロ後に強調された。

簡単にまとめると、ブッシュ政権は二つの新しい主義を進めた。今後の政権がこれを変えていくかもしれないが、おそらく従うだろう。第一に、より大きな米国安全保障を目的として、通商政策と二国間合意とが結びつけられた。通商政策は2002年の米国安全保障文書の一部となった。ここでその引用はしないが、基本的に、通商を外交政策の手段としてみている。これには含みがあり、ゼーリックは明確にこのことを伝えているが、米国は外交政策における通商政策を支持するものに自由貿易協定という報酬を与えるということである。このときはイラク戦争の最中で、これによってオーストラリアが前に出て、ニュージーランドが後ろに下がり、米国は中東の複数の国々とFTA交渉を行った。つまり、アメとムチを使い分け、実際に影響を与えた。このことは米国の貿易相手国、同盟国にとって非常に明確であった。

二点目は「自由化の競争」という注釈のついた明確な二国間主義、地域主義の考え方である。ゼーリックと政権は、多国間合意制度が最優先ではあるが、グローバルな自由貿易の構築方法はいくつかある。我々がほしいのは、自由化の競争である。つまり、一連の二国間合意を作り、他国は米国が二国間合意を地域協定に高める過程を見ながら、グローバルな自由貿易にもっていくというものである。

東アジアに話を移す前に、一つの問題点について話しておきたい。ゼーリックは、二国間主義から地域主義、そしてグローバルな自由貿易に発展するという以外に別の道があると考えた。世界最大の経済国である米国が、二国間合意を結びたいという国を引き付けることが容易である。我々にはこれだけの経済がある、分け前が欲しければ来なさいと。ところが、例えば南米共同市場の自由貿易地域で地域協定を結ぶと、さまざまな利害があるため、すぐにWTOと同じ問題、同じ障害に直面する。クリントン政権末期からブッシュ政権にかけて何が起きたかということ、ブラジルと米国が、とりわけ農業、アンチダンピング、サービスをめぐって意見が一致しなかったために、ある地点より先に進めず、合意が行き詰った。東アジアでも二国間合

意以上の交渉をしようとする、同じような問題に直面するだろう。

ブッシュ政権末期の今も、交渉中の二国間合意が8～10件ほどあり、ドミニカ共和国と中米その他6カ国との自由貿易協定、いわゆる「複数国主義」もある。しかし民主党が議会を支配した2006年に一時停止した。民主党は一つの小さな協定は認めたと、コロンビアと韓国については引き伸ばし、2009年まで決着しないであろう。

最後に、東アジアの話をしたい。1990年代初めから東アジアの地域主義には二つの競合する考え方がある。一つは、1990年代半ばから後半にかけてこの地域が動いていた頃の、APECに具体化される太平洋横断的地域主義である。私はこれまでも、これからも批判的なのだが、APEC合意について言えば、クリントン政権、ブッシュ政権の失態によって、完全に失敗したと思う。クリントン政権のアジア金融危機に対する対応は、経済的には正しかったかもしれないが、政治的には最悪だった。アジア危機の最中、クリントン政権は日本やAPEC諸国に部門別自由化をするよう圧力をかけ、失敗した。

日本はそれほど打撃を受けなかったが、他の国にとっては2度打たれた形になった。米国はそれらの国々に平手打ちを食らわせ、アジア金融危機を無視し、さらに新しい自由化をせよと追い討ちをかけた。クリントン政権は、それに対する抵抗には横を向き、中国のWTO加盟問題には努力した。このようなことが、ブッシュ政権になって同時多発テロにまで至った。

ブッシュ政権はAPECの貿易自由化などにあまり注意を払わず、安全保障に主眼を置き始めた。同時多発テロ以後の新しい状況への懸念から、APECの安全保障を取り上げることは意味がある。しかし、クリントン政権がそうだったように、ブッシュ政権にも行き過ぎがあった。ブッシュは2003年のAPEC首脳会議で一度も通商の話せず、つまり米国は、まったく気にかけていないということとなった。

もう一つは、当初は計画されていなかったが徐々に成長し、APECから受け継いだ二つ目の考え方、アジア内の構想である。1998年のASEAN+3は、アジア地域内の調整という長期的な見通しで始まったわけではないが、次々に広がりを見せて成長した。2000年、2001年に東アジアスタディグループが生まれ、ASEAN+3より大きい課題を捉えた計画が生まれたが、ブッシュ政権はまったく注意を払っていない。

こうした問題は未解決のままである、というのが現状であろう。東アジアサミット、日本がASEAN+3をどう切

り抜けるか、日本からASEAN+6に出された提案などについて詳しく述べないが、中国にいかに対抗して同盟するかという絶望気味なものであり、日本、韓国、シンガポールその他の米国の同盟国がすべき決断であり、太平洋横断的な構想が欲しいのか、それともアジア内の構想が欲しいのか、という観点から離れてしまうものだ。日本政府がなぜそうしたのは分かるが、状況を混乱させ、リーダーシップを放棄しただけのような気がする。

終わりに、現状はどうか、基本的に米国を中心に話す。米国の選択はどうなるか。ヒラリー・クリントンが大統領になったら、当面は、韓国を失いたくない、アジアを失いたくないだろうと思うであろうし、大統領・政権・民主党議会は、何らかの提案や政策をもってここに戻ってくると思われる。

そういうことであれば、3～4つの選択肢があるだろう。新しい大統領と議会のもとで、米国はひたすら二国間合意の道を歩む。再びタイとの交渉につき、マレーシアと交渉を行い、米国・ASEAN交渉を緩やかに、しかし確実に進め、どう展開するかを見る。

しばらく政権が手をつけていなかったが、米国の政策企業家フレッド・ブルックソンらが支持するように、米国が重要なアクターとなってAPECを基本にしたアジア太平洋の自由貿易を目指すという提案もある。つまり、二国間合意か、より大きな構図のアジア太平洋の自由貿易にいくか、二つの対極的な選択がある。

さらに中間的なものとして、もっとうまくいくだろうと思われる動きがある。日本・韓国・シンガポールという、現時点では鍵となると思われる同盟国と親密に協議をした結果、米国は日本と協力していわゆる「同志連合」を作ることができるのではないかと。人々は、すぐにも起こりそうなアジア太平洋の自由貿易という新しいビジョンに恐れをなしているが、現在のAPECを超えたいと希望する国もあるだろうし、ASEANがそこから離れている間に互惠主義に基づく合意に向かう国々があるだろう。なぜなら、東アジアはもちろんアジアの国々はすべて、すでに二国間の相互的な交渉を行っているからだ。

三点目に、米国は基本的に次のようなスタンスであろう。90年代初頭にマハティール首相が提唱し、明らかに米国に対抗することを目的とした東アジア経済委員会のように、東アジア域内の新しい組織や関係閣僚会議の開催は構わない。同盟国である日本、韓国、シンガポールに再び明確にしたいのは、ASEAN+3やASEAN+6など、どのような形の会議であれ、自由貿易協定に関する正式な交渉が始まるまでは、口を挟まない。しかし、米国はその時点で交渉

の席に着きたいということだ。

私自身はいわゆるドミノ理論を強く支持している。忘れてならないことは、もし2008年ではなく2009年に米韓合意が締結されれば、それがドミノ効果を生み出し、他国も加わらなければならないと思うようになるかもしれないことである。これまでそのようなことがなかったのは、米国の交渉相手国は、小さな国々だったからだ。大国同士では、まだ交渉を行っていない。ある二国が交渉を始めると、他国も動かなければならなくなるが、この場合は日本が動き始めるだろう。日本が対米、対韓という形で近づいてくる

のか、それとも両方が分からないが、日本が動き始め、それが成果となっていくであろう。

前提になるのは、ブッシュ政権において特徴的と思われていた通商・対外政策全般で、新しい政権も今後アジアに関わっていかなければならないということである。それは過去10年間に関わってきたようなやり方ではいけない。つまり、これまでのような二国間だけでなく、さらに広げて地域的な関わりをもつということだ。最後に述べた2つが米国にとって最も成果の大きなものになると考える。

[ERINAにて翻訳]

Keynote Address

"U.S. Trade Policy: The Rise of Regional and Bilateral Alternatives to Multilateralism"

BARFIELD, Claude

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What I'd like to do this afternoon is to talk a bit about, and explain, though certainly not always defend, the politics, the institutional basis, and the substance of United States' trade policy, and particularly the movement over the last two decades away from multilateralism as being the only tool in the kit of U.S. trade policy instruments toward regional and bilateral agreements. What I'd like to do first, just to give you some sense of how this is going to unfold, is back up for a minute and go over what I would call some basic characteristics or facts about U.S. trade policy that you may or may not know. Then I'd like to illustrate those opening remarks with a brief history of recent administrations and how they illustrate these themes and facts, ending with a few minutes on what this has to do with what's happening out here, and how the United States is reacting, has reacted, and is likely to react to events in not just Northeast Asia but East Asia.

Let me start with one reality that you may not have thought much about, and not just here, but in other countries too. We've heard a lot—and certainly for the Bush administration and even before it—of the strong American presidency, the overwhelming power of the executive in the United States. The Bush administration has met a great deal of criticism that it has attempted to thwart the will of the two other branches, particularly the legislative branch (but it has also gone against the judicial branch). It's certainly true that the Bush administration came into office feeling that the power of the U.S. executive had been diminished by, or during, administrations before it. Indeed, Vice-President Cheney has often talked about the American presidency never having really recovered from the Watergate years of the 1970s.

There's one thing you should be aware of, which is that in the formulation and the execution of U.S. trade

policy the president and the U.S. executive is distinctly the weaker institution. You may not have known that, but I think the United States is unique among the democracies of the world given the fact that the United States Constitution gives original and full authority over inter-state and foreign policy to the U.S. Congress. For two centuries, actually, presidents, administrations, and executives had very little to do with U.S. trade policy. U.S. trade policy from the 1790s through the end of the 1930s to the 1940s was basically tariff policy, and the Congress passed tariffs. There was negotiation with administrations, and it was obvious that before the twentieth century a Republican president would be pushing a Republican Congress for higher tariffs because of verbal agreement that theirs was a protectionist party. But by and large, trade policy of the degree that we had was made, formulated and executed by the U.S. Congress. It was a narrow border-tax policy.

I'm not going to go into detail about how all that changed after the 1930s, but the Congress decided, originally under a Democratic president with a Democratic Congress (but continuing under Republican presidents whether they had Democratic or Republican congresses) that matters had gotten too complex, and that it could no longer administer policy. It could formulate policy, and I'll be coming back to that—particularly when trade policy moved into areas that went beyond the border, or when it had to do with services or with regulation.

Another thing, just as a political footnote, was that there was a wave of reaction in the country to the way that the Congress had handled trade policy during the Depression. A number of figures in the United States at a bipartisan-level came out of the Second World War convinced that while protection in the 1930s by the United States and the rest of the world had not caused the Great

Depression and the Second World War, it had certainly been very intimately involved therein. From an economist's point of view, if it didn't cause the Depression, there was a unanimous agreement politically that it extended the Depression.

And so there was a fair amount of consensus that the president had to take over, and to some degree the president did. Yet it is still true that the United States Congress, the Ways and Means Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives, and the Finance Committee of the U.S. Senate are the final real arbiters. It has been said, not incorrectly I think, that the most important figure in the formulation of U.S. trade policy at any given time is the Chairman of the Ways and Means Committee. This is not to say that there is no coordination, or never any alliance, but ultimately it is down to the Congress.

Now, twenty years ago, the Congress, in continuing the movement to still allow some flexibility to the executive, passed what was called "trade promotion authority", a so-called "fast-track authority". Basically this meant that the Congress said to the president: "We still want to set the guidelines, we still want to set the major policies, but we will allow you, as you have been doing since the 1930s, and certainly since the beginning of GATT and then the WTO, to execute this policy. We expect you to do the negotiations. We cannot negotiate with other countries. However, we will give you the guidelines and we expect you to live up to those." The Congress next said, "What we owe you and what we owe our trading partners, because otherwise they will not come to the table with their final offers, is an up-or-down vote. We may disagree with the president. We may disagree with the administration. But what we will agree to is that within a certain length of time, we will give you a decision." The president could then go, whether to GATT or to a bilateral agreement with someone else, and say "Look, this is what we're going to do and I can assure you that the Congress will make a decision on this. It will not be protracted. It will not be something that will filibuster over several years. And you'll get an up-or-down vote." And that has been the key to the alliance, if you will, or the coordination of U.S. trade policy between the executive and the legislature since the 1970s.

That may be breaking down, and that brings me to a second point that I want to make. That is that since the late 1970s, but particularly from the late 80s through the 90s, the bipartisan support that you had for most of the post-Second World War period began to break down. (From 1945, or the early 1950s from the time that Eisenhower became president, you did have the Republicans ratifying the new trade policies that came out of the Second World War through the 1990s. There was a reasonable consensus that the United States should take the lead in trade liberalization.) That began to break down in the late 80s and certainly has continued to break down in the 90s until our own time. And you have a situation that while the Republicans by and large can be counted on to support free trade agreements, new free trade agreements or GATT/WTO agreements, the Democratic Party is deeply split. Routinely by the end of the Clinton administration of the 1990s (and I'll come back to this) about two-thirds of the

Democrats in the House of Representatives were voting against free trade agreements. This is not to say that there was not a minority or portion of the Republican Party that were voting against them, particularly as the Republican Party moved to the south with textile areas that had also moved in a protectionist or anti-global way. But by and large, it would be no over-simplification that you can think that two thirds of Republican states could be counted on and a third would be skeptical or opposed, and the Democrats would be coming from the opposite direction. And that has, I think, become even more significant now.

I'm not going to spend a lot of time on current U.S. trade politics. What I will say is this: That as late as Bill Clinton, in his early presidency, there was a huge fight about Clinton's inheritance of the NAFTA agreement from the Bush administration (a Republican administration) and his inheritance of the negotiations to end the Uruguay Round. After a real debate within the early Clinton presidency, the president and his chief economic advisers ended up on the side of greater trade liberalization. And Bill Clinton's "mantra" as it were, his slogan, in his early years as president, was "We will compete, not retreat."

Hillary Clinton, and this will be true with Obama—I'll just take the two leading Democratic candidates—have been very careful. While they have not come out totally in disagreement, Mrs. Clinton in particular, who's running to some degree on her husband's presidency, has to be very careful what she says. But she has made it very clear in private that you could not expect a third-term of a Clinton administration in trade policy, if she is elected, while she might follow the policies of others. Therefore you really do have this split in the Democratic Party, and I'll come back to this at the end because it's important. The Democrats took over Congress in 2006, and if they take over the presidency and the Congress in 2008, we are likely to see substantial changes in U.S. trade policy.

I do not know and I cannot predict exactly what those will be, because that brings me to a third point to make and that is that once in office presidents tend to be much more international than elected representatives. And you can understand this. Whether it was Eisenhower in the 1950s (who led the Republican Party away from the century-old protectionism that had been a bedrock tenet of Republican policies) or Presidents Carter and Clinton in the 80s and 90s (who fought the movement of their own party away from trade liberalization), you can normally count on a president to be much more internationally-minded—this is his or her responsibility finally. I'll come back to this because, while I may be fairly pessimistic about the economic underpinning of U.S. trade policy, in the end I think the responsibility of office and another point I'll make about foreign policy may be the reason that we will not see a wholesale turnaround in U.S. trade policy in 2009, no matter who wins or what the makeup of the Congress is.

So those are three political and institutional facts.

But let me move then to a fourth point, of matters of substance, because it'll get to what I'll be talking about a lot for the rest of this speech. And that is, while the United States—and a lot of what I'm going to be talking about after

this will be an analysis of this movement—has moved to add bilateralism or regionalism to its quiver of trade policies, multilateralism and the WTO (or previously GATT) remains the chief priority. It is the number one priority of any administration.

And even though I'm going to go into a fair amount of detail about the Bush administration's bilateral and regional policies, I think it would be unfair to say that the Bush administration moved away from multilateralism and from a top priority for completing the Doha Round at the same time that it began to negotiate bilateral agreements. This is not the time to analyze the Bush administration's positions on the Doha Round, and certainly I have criticized a good deal of what I think is their lack of guts, their lack of courage.

But having said that, in terms of any dumping or in terms of now at the very end of the Round not being able to pull together the political courage—and what the hell, Bush, it's all over so you might as well have political courage now—you have to have the political courage to come forward with the agricultural reforms of the Doha Round. (Looking back, the United States, in manufacturing, in services, in regulatory policy, in the key areas in the Doha Round, has taken the lead I think, and you cannot fault the administration for that, even though I may have some quibbles about what it had to say.) So I think the point is the world, the WTO and the multilateral system is still going to remain the top priority, and I think this will be true, by the way, whether we have a Republican or a Democratic president in 2009 and whatever else there is that they may or may not change about U.S. trade policy.

In some ways it should be a no-brainer for these politicians: We are a world economic power. For us not to try to negotiate with the largest group available would be silly, and I think you could tell that to even the dumbest politician in Washington, even though he or she may have a constituency which would tell them that on a particular issue they shouldn't go in that direction. But I think that's going to be the case.

Now having said that, I think we need to add a couple of other points though; not about the U.S. situation, but about the situation in the world. My own judgment is that we have reached some kind of end-point in the WTO, in the multilateral system. I hope I am wrong about this, but I think we will have, not an explosion, but either no real solution to the major problems of the Doha Round, or some package that is so small that it will impel nations to continue down the path of bilateral agreements and ultimately regional agreements. (This is not just the United States that I'm talking about at the minute, but the rest of the world, whether developed or developing countries.) I will, however, come back later to a point that I think makes regional agreements almost as difficult as multilateral agreements, but my thinking, my feeling is that bilateralism and regionalism are here to stay, and not just in East Asia, but around the world.

Now let me add a footnote. What is not, however, on the cards I think, is something that economists have worried about, starting a decade ago, that somehow the world will break up into three big blocs, that are mutually exclusive;

one in Asia, one in the Americas, and one arranged in some fashion around the European Union. If you look at what is happening that is not likely. Whether you look at the bilaterals that are being agreed to out here, or those of the United States, or those of the European Union, at least a third to a half are cross-regional. I mean, the European Union is following the United States to negotiating with Korea. If you look—I'll come back to this—United States' bilateral agreements are all over the world.

Now you just might expect that of the United States, but just look at a small country like Chile, or Mexico. I mean, Mexico and Chile are the "champions" of bilaterals. Chile has bilaterals with just about every region and as many countries as they can find. Singapore is on its way to doing the same thing. So that, while it's not multilateralism, I think we're not in the process—either in Asia or in any other region—of going for mutually-exclusive blocs that will fight each other. There are problems with bilateralism, but that, I think, is not going to be one of them.

And my final point is a basic general observation that increasingly (and I'm going to go into some detail about this when I deal about the Bush administration) the United States' trade policy is seen not as a separate entity, but as a means for larger foreign policy and security goals. Now I think there are special reasons that this came to the fore, as in our fully-articulated policy under the Bush administration. But I would also bet that in the next administration, whether Republican or Democrat, while they will change the terms, while they will not want to be seen for lots of reasons as an extension of the Bush administration, foreign policy considerations will really become an important, if not the single most important issue in terms of the formulation of U.S. trade policy.

And let me just say as a footnote, I am very skeptical at the moment—I hope I'm wrong again—of the U.S. – Korea Free Trade Agreement going through in the next year. I think it's going to go over to the next administration, and one interpretation will be that that's really trouble, because you've got a new Democratic president, whether it's Obama or Hillary Clinton, who has come into office blasting trade policy, blasting bilaterals, or criticizing the Koreans. But I would bet in the end it's going to go through and it's going to go through because a new Democratic president is not going to have to face the challenge of saying "Who lost Korea?" The point being, that if we slap the Koreans in the face after this negotiation, we should not have gotten into the negotiation if we weren't going to finish it, if we weren't going to vote positively.

The same is the case, right now, for what the Democratic Congress is facing with Colombia. How do you go to the electorate and say "Who lost Colombia?", "Who actually invited Chavez in?" Now I'm exaggerating, but that's where I think the political debate will come. And so increasingly, business will have to look at trade policy in conjunction with larger U.S. political and security goals (though this is not that economics and business interests are not going to be important).

We're not alone in this, but it's particularly important for the United States, I would say. U.S. businesses are going to bitch and moan about this, because they argued all during the Cold War that again and again American presidents

sacrificed U.S. economic interests to the Cold War. Well that actually really wasn't true, because what they were saying was that American presidents lowered barriers, we had a greater trade liberalization policy, and that meant that some industries were hurt by it on a temporary basis. For the national interest it was, I think, all to the good. But it was an article of faith from the 1960s to the early 1990s by certainly the sectoral industry, the steel industry, or even the automobile industry, that somehow they were getting the short end of the stick, because President Eisenhower or President Nixon or President Carter thought that we ought to do something to help our allies economically against the Soviets and the Chinese Communists. It wasn't true then, at least in terms of national interest, but I think it'll come up again.

Now I'm not going to spend a lot of time on individual administrations, but let me take just a couple of minutes and talk through the movement of the United States away from multilateralism as being its only trade policy. In this regard the United States is very much like Japan from 1945 to the late 1980s. Japan, once it got into GATT and the decades after that until 1999-2000, adhered very strongly and faithfully to the multilateral system and only reluctantly moved away from that. There's a lot of literature on this—I'm sure those in this audience know a lot about it.

Well the United States was in the same position for a long time. It actually had two policies. This really fitted with Japan, and Japan was very much involved here. It supported the GATT, but it also had what you might call "bilateralism-unilateralism". There were a number of areas in the 60s and the 70s through the 80s that the GATT didn't cover, and so the United States, whether it was with Japan, the European Economic Community, or other countries, always reserved the right to have individual bilateral negotiations outside of the GATT negotiations. And of course Japan was front and center from the 1970s to the 90s with this. And as I say, you can call it bilateralism or unilateralism, but it was a kind of *sub-rosa* policy that went along with the multilateral policy.

And I would say that in the 1980s and the 1990s, though the United States moved in the direction of bilateralism and regionalism, it did not set out to do so. I think it was not a fit of absentmindedness, but it was reacting to events. I think I've read it in the literature, not just out here in East Asia but in other trade literature, about the impact of NAFTA, or the impact of the Free Trade Area of the Americas, as the United States seemed to signal to the world in an assuming way. But what people don't remember is that the United States did not initiate the negotiations with Canada, they actually did not initiate the negotiations with Mexico, and then the consolidation of those into NAFTA. Canada and Mexico approached the United States. It wasn't something that the United States really had thought of as a consciously-developed theory as of the mid- to the late 1980s.

The only thing we'd had was a bilateral with Israel, which was *sui generis*. It had totally to do with Israel's position in the Middle East and was a vote of political confidence by the United States in Israel, and it was not part of a trade policy. It was, if you will, an early signal of the United States linking security policy to trade policy, but it

didn't really follow through.

And as a matter of fact it wasn't economics, again, it was security and political issues that really moved us in the direction of regionalism in the first Bush administration. I want to highlight this, because there's another theme that I'll draw and that is that people matter, individuals matter, and somebody can have a real influence. And one person who had a real influence on U.S. trade *and* security diplomatic policy was James Baker.

The reason that he was so strongly supportive of NAFTA was the political one, and the reason that the Bush administration first put forward the idea of an enterprise of the Americas which was somewhere way down the road of a free trade agreement of all of the Americas, was because, Baker, a Secretary of State and then later a Secretary of the Treasury, knew that he had to do something to compensate the South Americans. There are echoes here by the way from 1997, with the financial crisis out here—the South Americans had gone through their own financial crisis in the 1980s, though it wasn't as deep, and it wasn't as penetrating as the financial crisis in East Asia, and the United States, with the IMF, had administered, or was pushing them to administer, quite bitter medicine. What Baker said was that we have got to have something on the other side of this, that we have got to give something here. So that was the background.

And by the way, there's one interesting footnote. Baker did this all on his own. He knew at the time, that the U.S. Trade Representative, Carla Hills, and her then deputy, whose name we don't need but who was a long-time State Department and Trade Negotiator in the United States, were adamantly opposed to any movement toward bilaterals and regionals. They took it as an article of faith that the United States should stick with GATT and not move away from that. It would be a terrible signal, they thought, for the United States to move in this direction.

Baker just went around them. And Baker was closer to Reagan and later closer to Bush. The U.S. Trade Representative is ringed-in, often, by more powerful cabinet officers, and Mr. Baker (and Mr. Shultz under Reagan) just went around them. And thus was the reason it really had to do with a political and a diplomatic, rather than a purely economic decision based on some thought-out policy. Now having said that, however, it's also true that a number of events were pushing the United States in the direction of moving away, not the least of which being in 1989, 1990-91, (again mirroring where we might or might not be today), when it looked as if the Uruguay Round was not going to go anywhere. There had been a crisis in 1990, they had had a big meeting (not quite the same as the Cancún meeting of the WTO in 2003) but it looked as if it wasn't going anywhere, and so there was pressure upon the United States to move in another direction and Baker responded to that.

Now let me just quickly talk a little about the Clinton administration. What makes it fascinating is that I've already laid out the theme that by the time Clinton came into office his party was already deeply divided. And I would argue that two of Clinton's bravest acts—at least in one case as president—came in that first year when he backed NAFTA, knowing that his party was going to split

under him, and also backed the WTO.

One other thing to note about trade politics in the United States, however, is that, interestingly, the WTO negotiations and the Uruguay Round have never been as controversial in the United States—and I think if we got a Doha Round negotiation finished that would not be as controversial—as the individual bilaterals. And I think the reason for that is that when you have a multilateral negotiation, it is very hard for the demagogues, who really "demagogue" NAFTA, to make the case that the United States is making an agreement with a country that is much poorer, has much lower wages, and as Ross Perot said, there'll be this sucking sound of jobs out of the United States to some small, poor country, or poor countries. When you have the WTO you have rich countries, you have poor countries, you have middle-level countries—it's harder to make that issue stick. And indeed it didn't stick.

Clinton faced that situation. But he also faced a situation, after the Republicans came in in 1994—in other words, for the last six years of his presidency—where he did not have what I've referred to before; that is, trade promotion authority. The Congress refused to give it to him. And the reason that it did so was the split among the Democrats, and although a minority, you still had to have some votes from Democrats. They wanted the United States to push very hard for the inclusion of a much stronger regulatory system concerning labor and environmental rights, which at first they were willing to settle for outside as a part of a side-agreement, but increasingly have wanted inside the new agreements the United States has had. This opposition has continued right down to today, and it's what the Democratic candidates are talking about.

Now after 1994, Bill Clinton was never really willing to push hard enough to get trade promotion authority because he worried increasingly that it would hurt the party in congressional elections, and then finally in the late 1990s that it would hurt Albert Gore's chances of being president in 2001. In other words you had a split party and so you really couldn't advance.

What still happened, however, was that the Clinton administration, in terms of my theme today, was perfectly willing to make promises, because it didn't have to go to Congress. It first put together, in Miami in 1994, a declaration that moved toward free trade of the Americas by 2005. Now this was going to be after Clinton left office, and he didn't have to do anything with Congress, so he just made the promise.

The same thing is true to a great degree with what happened in APEC, where in 1994, as you know, you had the Bogor Goals which were for 2010 and 2020. Now there's another reason that APEC was *sui generis*, and that is it was a very different kind of trade agreement. Under APEC you did not have, and you do not now have, a normal reciprocity-based agreement. Led by Japan and the ASEAN countries, this was supposed to be what was called a "concerted unilateralism"—that is, you would move toward the goal of free trade by 2010 or 2020 at your own pace. There would be none of this rules-based stuff. So, really, it was easy for Clinton to do this, because he wasn't going to have to live up to it.

There was also one final thing in the Clinton

administration, just for those of you who are economists. That is, under Clinton you had the first of the raging debate among U.S. economists. Not saying that other economists didn't do this, but in the United States there was a debate, purely on an economic basis, on what were the implications of the United States or any other country, or a whole group of countries, going for bilateralism or regionalism versus multilateralism, the dangers of trade diversion, and the dangers of an inefficient system.

And you had on the one hand, someone whose name you probably know over here, Lawrence Summers, who was Under Secretary and then Secretary of the Treasury, then later President of Harvard, and Laura Tyson, another name famous in Japan, who argued within the Clinton administration that all of these are to the good. I think, I forget the quote that Summers had about it, but to paraphrase he said "I'm for all the '-isms'. I'm for multilateralism, I'm for bilateralism, I'm for regionalism, it's all lowering barriers."

Against that was the perennial Nobel Prize—candidate, Jagdish Bhagwati, and a whole other group of economists, who thought that this was the wrong way for the United States to go, that this was a terrible signal and that it would just create great inefficiencies in the world economy and that we should not be leading this. It was an academic debate that spilt over into politics. You had this debate at any rate, but Clinton was really thwarted for the last six years. So you really didn't have any advance beyond just the decision or the Seattle "explosion".

Let me turn now to the Bush administration, and as I've said, we'd had discussions for a decade about bilateralism and regionalism, and you had intimations under James Baker and under Bush "One" that foreign policy and security should have a bigger place in trade policy or stand as an equal.

But for better or for worse it is the Bush administration under Robert Zoellick—and it's not just Zoellick, the president actually backed all this, so it's a Bush initiative—that really put all this together in a set of doctrines, which represented, if not a turning-point, at least a very important establishing of two new tenets as real doctrines backed by a president and the administration, as opposed to debates among economists or debates on the issues that you had no control over as you'd had under Clinton. And I said people were important; I think you might have had a free trade representative do this because it was post-9/11. I think it was key that Zoellick was there because he was a protégé of James Baker. Zoellick was then, and is now, an unusual person as a U.S. trade representative. It is not to denigrate Carla Hills, or Mickey Kantor, or Charlene Barshefsky, for Bush "One" or Clinton, to say that they were trade warriors and their vision was about trade. Robert Zoellick's primary ambition, really, was to be Secretary of State of the United States at some point, and he saw trade policy, as his mentor Baker had seen it, as a part of the larger set of U.S. national interests. This was obviously underscored after 9/11.

But to make a long story short, the Bush administration came forward with two, I think new, tenets, and while new administrations may change these, I think they will abide by them. For one, there was the explicit linking of trade policy,

and indeed bilateral agreements, with larger U.S. security goals. Trade policy became a part of the U.S. national security document of 2002. I'm not going to take the time to read you that part of the document, but it basically says we see trade as an instrument of foreign policy. And that had several implications by the way. It meant, and Zoellick was very explicit about this, that the United States would also reward those who backed it in foreign policy with free trade agreements. At that time it was the Iraq War, and it's the reason that Australia was moved to the front and New Zealand was put to the back of the line, and it's the reason, actually, that in addition to economic FTAs, the United States negotiated FTAs with a number of countries in the Middle East. Therefore it was used both as a reward and a punishment, and they actually acted on it. They were very clear to U.S.-trading partners and our allies.

The second point had been adumbrated before, but it was an explicit theory about bilateralism and regionalism that came under the rubric of "competitive liberalization". What Zoellick and what the administration argued was that—and as I've said from the beginning, I think it's fair to say that they followed this through—the multilateral system is our number one priority, but we think you can build global free trade in a number of ways; what we would like to get is a competition of liberalization—that is, that you build from a whole series of bilateral agreements, and others see the United States going from making bilateral agreements to regional agreements, and build that way to global free trade, as opposed to *just* going to Geneva.

I'm not going into detail about this, but there's one problem or flaw, before I turn, for the rest of this address, to East Asia. At least so far. Zoellick saw that there was another route to go; as I said, you'd build from bilateral to regional to global free trade. The problem so far has been—and this has implications out here in Asia by the way—that it is very easy for the United States, the world's largest economy, to attract and get other countries to come to it for bilateral agreements. We've got this economy—if you want a share in it, just come. But when you get to regional agreements, and the example that I'm going to give (though not in any detail) is the Free Trade Area of the Americas agreement, you find very quickly that you come to many of the same problems and the same obstacles that you have in the WTO, because you have this multiplicity of interests. And what has happened, and what happened to the end of the Clinton administration and through the Bush administration was that, because of disagreements between Brazil and the United States in particular over agriculture, anti-dumping and services, you found you just couldn't proceed beyond a certain point. And so that agreement has stalled. Now as I say, if and when you begin to negotiate beyond bilateral agreements out here in East Asia, you probably will find some of the same problems.

What you have at the end of the Bush administration now are some eight or ten bilaterals that have been negotiated, and you have a so-called "plurilateral", which is the Dominican Republic–Central America Free Trade Agreement with six other countries. There is a substantial record. All of this, however, came to a halt in 2006 when

the Democrats won the Congress back. The Democrats have allowed one small agreement to go through, but they're balking at Colombia and at South Korea. We'll have to wait I think until 2009.

Now let me turn finally to East Asia, and I'll move along quickly here, and oversimplify. There have been, I would say, from the early 1990s, two competing visions about regionalism in East Asia. One—if not predominant, but at least where the region seemed to have been moving from the mid- to the late 1990s—was a trans-Pacific regionalism, embodied in APEC. (I'll come back to this. You can build subsets of this.) And the APEC agreement—and I was critical before and I'll be critical now—I think foundered because of blundering, first with the Clinton administration, and then with the Bush administration. The Clinton administration's reaction to the Asian Financial Crisis, while it was, I would argue, economically correct, was politically a disaster. And then, in the midst of this crisis out here, the Clinton administration blundered forward with pressure on Japan and other countries in APEC to go forward with a set of sectoral liberalizations.

Right in the midst of this, Japan wasn't really hurting that much and it had other reasons I think for digging its heels in, but for other countries it was like a one-two punch. The United States just hit them, ignored them and the Asian Financial Crisis (I don't think it did, but I understand why they thought that) and then came forward with a set of new liberalizations while these guys were down on their knees. The Clinton administration, when it was rebuffed here, just turned away. It spent its last year, actually, trying to get China, interestingly enough, into the WTO. It didn't really pay any attention to the crisis.

Now this was compounded, after Bush came in, by 9/11; the Bush administration actually paid little attention to the trade liberalization part of APEC and to other aspects of APEC beyond just trade, and tried to shift its chief function toward security. Now it makes sense to have a security part of APEC, probably, because of the crisis of terrorism, and because of questions of a new situation post-9/11. But, just as the Clinton administration before it, the Bush administration went too far. Bush went to the APEC meetings in 2003 and gave a speech in which he never mentioned trade once. And so the thinking out here obviously was that the United States really didn't care.

Meanwhile you had the second vision—I don't think planned, initially, but beginning to grow and really take over from APEC—and that is an intra-Asian vision. There was ASEAN Plus Three in 1998, which didn't start with any long-term vision of an intra-Asian regional set of arrangements, but grew like topsy; it was one thing that led to another and then to another. So by 2000 and 2001, when you have the East Asian Study Group, when you have plans regarding the kinds of issues that are larger than trade and than ASEAN Plus Three, you have these two visions and the Bush administration is not paying any attention.

So that is to some degree where we stand now, with things unresolved. I'm not going to go into detail about the East Asian Summit and Japan's attempt to get around the ASEAN Plus Three, or what seems to me is a very ill-thought-out proposal by Japan for an ASEAN Plus Six,

which smacks of desperation about getting allies against the Chinese and gets you away from a decision that Japan, Korea, Singapore, or other allies of the U.S. are going to have to make: Whether you want a trans-Pacific vision, or whether you want an intra-Asian vision. So that, while I understand why the Japanese government did this, it seems to me to do nothing more than confuse the situation and be essentially an abdication of leadership.

Let me finish by saying "Where do we stand now?" And in essence this is about the United States. What are the United States' options? And for the moment I'm going to assume that President Hillary Clinton will not want to "lose Korea" or "lose Asia," and she and her administration, and a Democratic Congress, is going to come back out here with some set of proposals and some kind of policies.

So, that being the case, I think there are three or four options. The United States could just continue—assuming that there is a new president and a new Congress—going a bilateral route. It could go back to negotiations with Thailand, pick up the negotiations with Malaysia, keep pushing gently but firmly on U.S. – ASEAN negotiations, and just see how things play out.

There has been a proposal, that the administration stayed away from for a while but has finally endorsed, by policy entrepreneurs in the United States (Fred Brookson and others), for the United States to go for the "big enchilada" as it were, for a free trade of the Asia – Pacific based upon APEC.

So you've got these "polar" options; you could do bilaterals, or you could go for a big-picture free trade of the Asia – Pacific.

Now I think there are several sorts of intermediate moves that are more likely to be more successful. After consultation with what I think are the three key countries right now—Japan, Korea and Singapore, (Singapore thinks more strategically, because of where it is and what it is, than any other country out here), I think one thing that the United States, in conjunction by the way with Japan, could try to put together is a so-called "coalition of the willing", after discussion with our closest allies; that is, people are understandably scared about this whole big new vision of a free trade of the Asia – Pacific any time soon, but there may very well be nations that are willing to go beyond where APEC is now. And also, I would argue, that while ASEAN has just once again walked away from it, I think that there are a number of countries, despite what was said in

1998-99, that are ready for reciprocity-based agreements—because think of it, every Asian country, certainly every East Asian country, has already negotiated or is negotiating bilateral, reciprocal, traditional agreements. So you might be able to do something there in that regard.

A third option, or a second option within that, would be that the United States basically could do the following: Make the point that we are not going to—as we did in the early 1990s abutment with the East Asian Economic Caucus that Mahathir put forward, which was clearly aimed against the United States—oppose a new intra-East Asian organization, or the meeting of all kinds of different ministers, but there's one thing that we do want to make clear, again to our closest allies, Japan, Korea and Singapore, and that is, we're not going to raise any question until you decide, within whatever forum (the ASEAN Plus Three, or the ASEAN Plus Six), that you will enter into a formal negotiation for a free trade agreement. At that point the United States wants to be at the table. I don't know which way we'll go, and we may not go any of those ways.

I would say that the other thing to keep in mind is that I am a very strong adherent to the so-called domino theory and I think that if, as I believe in 2009, if not in 2008, the U.S.-Korea agreement is ratified, it will produce a domino effect; that is, others will feel that they need to come in. The reason it hasn't happened before is that the countries that Asian countries or we have negotiated with are small countries. None of the big countries, yet, have negotiated with each other. At any point any two of them do, the others are going to have to move, and in this case I think Japan would move. It would either move to come to us, or to Korea, or to both of us. And so I think that you're going to have this trip-wire that will come to fruition.

Now, I think I will leave it there, on a note that, as I say, all of this assumes that a new administration will continue—whatever one thinks about the particulars of the Bush administration's overall trade or foreign policy—to think that the United States has got to be engaged in Asia, and engaged in a way that we have not been for the last decade; and that is not just bilaterally, but in some outreach to regional institutions, in some way, far beyond what we have done so far. I think that there are a lot of ways of doing this, but of the four that I've mentioned, the last two are the ones that are the most likely, or the most likely to be fruitful for the United States.